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“If one party has a duty to perform an act, the other party has a 
correlative right that the act shall be performed.”1 
                                                 
 Professor of Law, Pace Law School, White Plains, New York. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The common law landlord-tenant rules were fraught with paradoxes, 
at least for the lowly tenant, who had many burdens, but few rights. Then in 
the 1960s, a revolution broke out. At least that is how Professor Edward 
Rabin described the momentous changes in residential landlord-tenant law.2 
He concluded that in the revolution, the “residential tenant, long a stepchild 
of the law, ha[d] now become its ward and darling. Tenants’ rights . . . 
increased dramatically; landlords’ rights . . . decreased dramatically.”3 Like 
all revolutions, no one event or cause can be singled out; instead long-
simmering grievances and discontent prompted the vanguard to disrupt 
aspects of the existing order.4 To be sure, changes in the rhythms of life and 
the migration of economic pursuits away from the land toward an industrial 
and urban society must have factored in, as well as the growing state of 
relative deprivation felt by the poor. 5  In this vein, Professor Mary Ann 
Glendon, perceived the changes in landlord-tenant law as more evolutionary, 
the “culmination, in one area of the law, of certain long-standing trends that 
ha[d] transformed not only landlord-tenant law, but private law generally, 
over the previous half-century.”6 
The Uniform Residential Landlord-Tenant Act (“URLTA”) 7  was 
promulgated in 1973 in the midst of these shifts in public and private law and 
promised to harmonize the discordant voices that emerged to give legibility 
to the new order. Achieving harmony required not only a coherent narrative 
and set of rules to govern landlord-tenant law, but also one that discarded the 
burdensome historical legacies and would be uniformly incorporated within 
the new regime. While the URLTA abrogated the common law no-repair 
                                                                                                                   
1 Yu v. Paperchase P’ship, 845 P.2d 158, 164 (1992), citing Wesley N. Hohfeld, 
Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 28–
29, 32–35 (1913). 
2 See Edward H. Rabin, The Revolution in Residential Landlord-Tenant Law: 
Causes and Consequences, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 517, 519 (1984). 
3 Id. at 519. 
4 RALPH H. TURNER AND LEWIS M. KILLIAN, COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR 258–59 
(1972). 
5 For a discussion on the theory of relative deprivation as an impetus for abrupt 
social change, see RICHARD A. BERK, COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR 49–51 (Ann L Greer & Scott 
Greer eds., 1974). 
6 Mary Ann Glendon, The Transformation of American Landlord-Tenant Law, 
23 B.C. L. REV. 503, 504 (1982). This phenomenon also appeared in other areas of law, such 
as trade, giving rise to the Uniform Commercial Code that regulate the sale of goods, and 
other governmental regulations, such as minimum wage laws and workplace safety rules. See 
also Hiram H. Lesar, The Landlord-Tenant Relation in Perspective: From Status to Contract 
and Back in 900 Years?, 9 U. KAN. L. REV. 369, 369–72 (1961). 
7 7B UNIFORM LAWS ANN.285 (2010). 
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rule,8 by imposing upon the landlord a duty to maintain the premises,9 it left 
undisturbed an intersecting, hence conflicting rule—landlord-tort immunity. 
Because states variously adopted all or parts of the URLTA, courts 
have taken disparate positions on the legal and normative import of this 
duty—some read the duty to maintain the premises in a habitable condition 
quite literally, limiting it to pertain only to matters like heat and sanitation 
and limiting remedies to the economic losses a tenant would suffer from a 
breach of that duty.10 
Now, 40 years later, the Uniform Laws Commission has undertaken 
a revision of the URLTA.11 The landscape of landlord-tenant law in general 
should have informed the Commissioners on what to do about the no-tort-
liability rule, but the most recent published draft of the revised URLTA 
punts.12 It does not prescribe a rule imposing tort liability on landlords for 
defective or hazardous conditions, nor otherwise take a position, leaving the 
issue for state-by-state resolution.13 
The Commissioners might have chosen this course out of regard for 
the interest in stability in the law. The “desirability and need for certainty in 
planning our affairs, both in their internal (professional) and external aspects, 
render reliance on precedent an attractive and useful doctrine.”14  Yet, in 
                                                 
8 See MILTON R. FRIEDMAN, FRIEDMAN ON LEASES 607 (4th ed. 1997) (“The rule 
was rationalized by the theory that a lease is a conveyance, a sale for the term, to which caveat 
emptor applied.”). 
9 See infra Parts II.A.1, III.B.1, IV.A.1. 
10 See Tighe v. Cedar Lawn, Inc., 649 N.W.2d 520, 529–30 (Neb. Ct. App. 2002) 
(allocating responsibility for maintenance of well cover to tenants according to the lease 
agreement); Steward v. Holland Family Props., LLC, 726 S.E.2d 251, 259 (Va. 2012) 
(describing the presence of lead paint in the air which, if substantiated through fact, could 
establish that the defect was open and obvious); Isbell v. Commercial Inv. Assoc., Inc., 644 
S.E.2d 72, 74 (Va. 2007) (holding that lessee may not bring a personal injury action against 
tenant when complete possession is surrendered to the lessee); True v. Fath Bluegrass Manor 
Apartment, 358 S.W.3d 23, 25–26 (Ken. Ct. App. 2011) (holding that tenant’s knowledge of 
safety hazard barred recovery). 
11 National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform Laws, Draft: Revised 
Uniform Residential Landlord Tenant Act (Jun. 5, 2014), available at http://www.uniformlaws
.org/shared/docs/residential%20landlord%20and%20tenant/2014am_rurlta_draft.pdf. 
12 See id. 
13 Id. This draft provides: “Remedies available to the tenant pursuant to Section 
501 are not exclusive.” Id. at § 110. Further, the draft continues, “thus, to the extent permitted 
by state law, tort remedies also may be available.” Id. at § 501. Whether this stance is “in 
shame of cowardice” (WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, JULIUS CAESAR act 2, sc. 2.) or based upon 
larger principles, is not evident from the draft. 
14 Paul E. Loving, The Justice of Certainty, 73 OR. L. REV. 743, 744 n.5 (1994). 
Reliance on the principle of stare decisis encourages investment for productivity: “if we want 
farmers to plant crops in the spring, they must have some assurance that they will be free to 
harvest that crop for their benefit in the fall. If we want farmers to maintain an efficient and 
well-maintained farm, they must be assured that they will be able to continue farming.” 
Shelby D. Green, No Entry to Public Lands: Towards a Theory of a Public Trust Servitude for 
a Way over Abutting Private Land, 14 WYO. L REV. 19, 74 (2014) (citing Richard A. Epstein, 
How to Create—or Destroy—Wealth in Real Property, 58 AL. L. REV. 741, 748 (2007)). 
Stability in the law allows intelligent choice about investments of time and resources. 
3
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Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’ oft-quoted words, “it is revolting to have no 
better reason for a rule of law” than that it is ancient and even more so if the 
reasons for the rule have long since disappeared, but persists out of blind 
imitation.15 Indeed, it is the readiness of common law judges to abandon 
rules that do not serve the public, which has contributed to its survival.16 
Though nominally tethered to precedent, the endlessly changing patterns of 
fact, politics and social relations, lead to extensions, revisions and sometimes 
abandonment of legal rules. In the case of landlord-tenant law, beginning in 
the middle of the twentieth century, the movement was more dramatic than 
gradual. 17  Drawing a line at landlord-tort immunity was not a logical 
stopping point. An overt break with tort immunity is preferable and would 
not disturb settled expectations, since the revolution was televised.18 
In this article, I show how a coherent legal narrative must capture the 
revolution’s radical policy by abandoning the no tort liability rule, which can 
be done in a number of ways: an open acknowledgement that the duty to 
repair creates a new property right that must be enforced by a property rule 
or more subtly through the use of both traditional and modern tools of 
jurisprudence, that is, legal fictions, equitable maxims and economic 
efficiency analysis.19 This article proceeds with a discussion of the common 
law landlord-tenant law, the adoption of the implied warranty of habitability, 
along with the persistence of the opposing rule of no tort liability of 
landlords in Part II.20 In Part III, I discuss the scope and coverage of the 
URLTA.21 In Part IV, I discuss the creation of a new regime using both 
traditional and modern tools of judicial decision-making. 22  In Part V, I 
discuss what the duty to repair, as a new property interest, requires for its 
fulfillment.23 Conclusions follow in Part VI.24 
II.  COMMON-LAW PARADOXES 
The rules of the common law were relatively simple and founded 
upon a logic suitable to the time. 25  The common law recognized and 
                                                 
15 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 
(1897). 
16 See Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F. 2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1970) 
(abandoning the common law no repair rule); Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 251 A.2d 268, 
275 (N.J. 1969) (rejecting independence of covenant theory). 
17 See Glendon, supra note 6, at 504. 
18 See GIL SCOTT-HERON, THE REVOLUTION WILL NOT BE TELEVISED (Flying 
Dutchman Prods.) (1970). 
19 See infra Parts IV, V. 
20 See infra Part II. 
21 See infra Part III. 
22 See infra Part IV. 
23 See infra Part V. 
24 See infra Part VI. 
25 For a thorough treatment of landlord-tenant law, see ROBERT S. SCHOSHINSKI, 
AMERICAN LAW OF LANDLORD-TENANT (1980). 
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protected the legal interests one held in land and held little concern for the 
physical conditions in which a leasehold tenant lived and worked.26 This was 
so because the law viewed the lease as a conveyance, the tenant thereby 
acquiring an interest in land with exclusive possession and concomitantly, 
exclusive maintenance responsibilities. 27  The rules sometimes operated 
paradoxically, perversely—they bound him to continue to perform his 
promises, even if the landlord failed to perform his;28 made him subject to 
eviction by self-help if he failed to pay rent, but bound him to pay rent even 
if the buildings were destroyed by an act of God;29 and bound him to repair 
and maintain, but made him liable if he overused the land.30 It thus behooved 
the tenant to inspect the premises before entering into the relationship, else 
he took possession with whatever defects existed at the time of the lease, 
although such inspection was useless in the case of the modern urban tenant. 
Lacking handyman skills, resources or access, the urban tenant suffered the 
effects of peeling lead-based paint, infestation of vermin, and dysfunctional 
infrastructure. 
While this “no-repair” rule operated ruthlessly in its pure form, it 
was nonetheless a default rule as a tenant with sufficient bargaining power 
could negotiate for a landlord’s express undertaking to repair.31 
A.  No-Repair Rule Abandoned 
The no-repair rule had a certain appeal as it pertained to leases of 
agricultural land in which the landlord was absent and the tenant was in sole 
possession, but the rule persisted, without regard to its appropriateness, well 
after the agricultural lease ceased to be the predominant type of lease.32 It 
was not until fairly recently that observers who marked changes in social 
conditions made the case for a change in the rules, that is, that the modern 
                                                 
26 Lesar, supra note 6 at 371, 373. 
27 FREIDMAN supra note 8, at 610. 
28 This meant that the aggrieved party was relegated to suing for contractual 
relief, and in the case of the landlord, seizing and holding chattels on the land as security for 
rent. 
29 For cases discussing the common law rule, see e.g., Albert M. Greenfield & 
Co. v. Kolea, 380 A.2d 758, 759–60 (Pa. 1976); Crow Lumber & Bldg Materials Co. v. 
Washington Cnty. Library Bd., 428 S.W. 2d 758, 761 (Mo. Ct. App. 1968). 
30 The rule was “settled” by 1485. 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH 
LAW 122–23 (6th ed. 1934). An even older rule prohibited the tenant from committing waste. 
Id. The writ of waste expanded as the tenant’s right to possession grew stronger. Id. 
Eventually, in order to protect the landowner’s reversionary interest, the tenant became 
obligated to make repairs and was liable to eviction and damages if he failed to do so. Id. 
31 See discussion infra Part II.A on the liability of the landlord for failure of this 
undertaking. However, the common law was literal in its application, as it treated covenants as 
independent, which meant the failure of a landlord to fulfill his promise to repair did not 
privilege the tenant to withhold rent. See Lesar supra note 6, at 369–77. Instead, the tenant 
had an action in damages. See Lesar supra note 6, at 369–77; see also Reste Realty Corp., 251 
A.2d at 276. 
32 FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 610. 
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tenant sought housing to live in and not the land to work; that she had little 
ability to inspect beneath the floors or in the walls to discover hidden defects 
before entering into the lease.33 One of the first courts to respond was the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court, which in Pines v. Perssion, adopted a rule that 
residential leases between landlord and tenant carried with them an implied 
warranty of habitability and fitness—a promise that the premises would be fit 
for human habitation.34 In reaching this result, the court said: 
[T]he frame of reference in which the old common-law rule 
operated has changed. Legislation and administrative rules, 
such as the safe place statute, building codes, and health 
regulations, all impose certain duties on a property owner 
with respect to the condition of his premises. Thus, the 
legislature has made a policy judgment—that it is socially 
(and politically) desirable to impose these duties on a 
property owner—which has rendered the old common-law 
rule obsolete.35 
Pines was followed by Lemle v. Breeden,36 and then Javins v. First 
Nat’l Realty Corp.37 Javins is oft-cited as the case that made the definitive 
break with traditional concepts of landlord-tenant law.38 There, the court 
pointed out that the expectations of the modern residential tenant showed that 
the no-repair rule was based on factual assumptions which were no longer 
true; the old common law rule that put the burden to repair on the tenant was 
never really intended to apply to residential urban leaseholds.39 Indeed, the 
relation of landlord-tenant more resembled that between parties to a contract, 
involving mutual promises for a package of goods and services—consisting 
of not merely walls and ceilings, but adequate heat, light, plumbing, secure 
windows—than a transfer of an interest in land. 40  In construing this 
contractual relation, a court needed to look not only to express terms actually 
negotiated, but also those that should be implied based upon presumed 
intentions.41  In Javins, the court believed the parties presumed that their 
respective duties would include the landlord’s fulfillment of obligations 
                                                 
33 Actually, at least one state rejected the common law rule much earlier. In 1895, 
the Georgia legislature enacted a statute imposing a duty of reasonable care on landlords and 
providing a remedy in the form of damages for injuries resulting from a landlord’s failure to 
keep the premises in repair. See O.C.G.A. § 44-7-14 (2014). 
34 Pines v. Perssion, 111 N.W.2d 409, 412–13 (Wis. 1961). 
35 Id. at 412. 
36 Lemle v. Breeden, 462 P.2d 470 (Haw. 1969). 
37 Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp, 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
38 See Old Town Dev. Co. v. Langford, 349 N.E.2d 744, 756 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1976); Olin L. Browder, The Taming of a Duty—The Tort Liability of Landlords, 81 MICH. L. 
REV. 99, 109 (1982). 
39 Javins, 428 F. 2d at 1080. 
40 Id. at 1074. 
41 Id. at 1075. 
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under the existing housing codes.42 Moreover, if the general rule is that a 
landlord may be liable for a breach of an undertaking to repair, then it really 
should not matter whether the undertaking is express or implied by law.43 
The high courts of many other jurisdictions have followed suit44 and 
urged by the courts, the legislatures of most states also have adopted laws 
providing for statutory warranties. 45  The warranty has been variously 
interpreted to require a landlord to keep the premises clean, safe, and fit for 
human habitation, and is generally said to be non-waivable.46 
                                                 
42 Id. at 1081. The honesty of this assertion surely is questionable given general 
notions of self-interest that characterizes contract bargaining. Considering the circumstances 
of most slum tenants, the landlord-tenant relation can hardly be said to result from bargaining. 
43 But see Johnson v. Scandia Assocs., Inc., 717 N.E.2d 24, 32 (Ind. 1999). In 
Johnson, the Indiana Supreme Court drew a distinction between express and implied 
warranties of habitability for purposes of tort recovery. Id. It stated that where the warranty of 
habitability is express, consequential damages for personal injury may be available as a 
remedy; however, where the warranty is implied in fact, consequential damages may not be 
awarded because personal injury is outside the parties’ contemplation. Id. 
44 See Green v. Superior Ct., 517 P.2d 1168, 1169–70 (Cal. 1974); Jack Spring, 
Inc. v. Little, 280 N.E.2d 208, 217 (Ill. 1972); Johnson, 717 N.E.2d at 28; Mease v. Fox, 200 
N.W.2d 791, 796 (Iowa 1972); Steele v. Latimer, 521 P.2d 304, 309–10 (Kan. 1974); Boston 
Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d 831, 843 (Mass. 1973); Detling v. Edelbrock, 671 
S.W.2d 265, 270 (Mo. 1984); O’Cain v. Harvey Freeman & Sons, Inc., 603 So. 2d 824, 833 
(Miss. 1991); Kline v. Burns, 276 A.2d 248, 251-52 (N.H. 1971); Marini v. Ireland, 265 A.2d 
526, 534 (N.J. 1970); Pugh v. Holmes, 405 A.2d 897, 900 (Pa. 1979); Kamarath v. Bennett, 
568 S.W.2d 658, 660–61 (Tex. 1978); Wade v. Jobe, 818 P.2d 1006, 1010 (Utah 1991); Hilder 
v. St. Peter, 478 A.2d 202, 208 (Vt. 1984); Foisy v. Wyman, 515 P.2d 160, 164 (Wash. 1973); 
Teller v. McCoy, 253 S.E.2d 114, 123 (W. Va. 1978). 
45 Jurisdictions with statutory warranties include: ALA. CODE § 35-9A-204 
(2014); ALASKA STAT. § 34.03.100 (2014); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1324 (2014); CAL. 
CIV. CODE § 1941 (West 2014); COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-12-503 (2014); CONN. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. § 47a-7 (West 2014); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 5305 (2014); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 83.51 
(West 2014); GA. CODE ANN. § 44-7-13 (2014); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 521-42 (LexisNexis 
2014); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-320 (2014); IND. CODE ANN. § 32-31-8-5 (West 2014); IOWA 
CODE ANN. § 562A.15 (West 2014); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-2553 (West 2014); KY. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 383.595 (LexisNexis 2014); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2691 (2014); ME. REV. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6021 (2014); MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 8-211 (LexisNexis 2014); 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111, §§ 127–127P, ch. 239, §§ 1–9 (West 2014); MICH. COMP. 
LAWS ANN. § 554.139 (West 2014); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 504B.161 (West 2014); MISS. CODE 
ANN. § 89-8-23 (2014); MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-24-303 (2014); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 76-
1419 (LexisNexis 2014); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 118A.280 (LexisNexis 2014); N.M. STAT. 
ANN. § 47-8-20 (West 2014); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 235-b (McKinney 2014); N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 42-42 (2014); N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-16-13.1 (2013); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
5321.04 (LexisNexis 2014); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 41, § 118 (West 2014); OR. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 90.320 (West 2014); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 34-18-22 (West 2014); S.C. CODE ANN. § 
27-40-440 (2014); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 43-32-8 (2014); TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-28-304 
(2014); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.052 (West 2013); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4457 (2014); 
VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.13 (2014); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.060 (LexisNexis 2014); 
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 37-6-30 (LexisNexis 2014); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 704.07 (West 2013); 
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-21-1202 (2014). 
46 See, e.g., Hilder, 478 A.2d at 208 (holding that landlord’s failure to repair 
sewer pipe that deposited waste in the basement, repair peeling plaster and broken window 
and install conventional door locks, breached warranty). 
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B.  No-Liability Rule Retained 
As the conception of the landlord-tenant relation moved from a 
conveyance of an interest in land to at least, in part, contract, the warranties 
then became a part of the bargain between the landlord and tenant, giving 
rise to damages to the tenant for loss of bargain or specific performance if 
the warranties were not fulfilled, essentially the recovery for economic 
losses.47 But, if the tenant fell through a hole in the floor, could she sue to 
recover for her personal injury? Surprisingly, this circumstance seemed not 
to have been within the contemplation of many courts or legislatures as they 
adopted the implied warranty of habitability. Perhaps, it was thought that the 
implied warranty itself would displace the no tort liability rule. 
In the general scheme of tort law, the breach of a duty of care has 
long been the indispensable predicate for tort liability. That duty might arise 
from a particular undertaking, a relation between the parties or from the 
circumstance of foreseeability. In the landlord-tenant context, the no-repair 
rule rested upon the early conception of a lease as a conveyance. The 
landlord, having no present interest in or control over the premises was not 
liable to the tenant or third persons for personal injury or personal property 
damage caused by a defect present at the transfer of possession or by defects 
arising during the term of the leasehold.48 In this conception, the no-tort 
liability rule operated in parallel and not opposed to the no-repair rule. 
This rule, like all rules, was subject to varying exceptions. 49  A 
landlord could be liable in tort for: dangerous conditions of which he was 
aware at the lease’s commencement;50 conditions in the “common areas,” 
over which the landlord had control; 51  premises leased for purposes 
                                                 
47 Id. (describing the full panoply of contract remedies available to the tenant). 
48 See generally Browder, supra note 38, at 101 (citing Old Town, 349 N.E.2d at 
753–54). Browder also believes this position partially resulted from the principle of caveat 
emptor, that is, the delivery of the possession of the premises, carried no implied warranties or 
other duties on the part of the landlord with respect to the condition of the premises. Id. 
49 Old Town, 349 N.E.2d at 754–55. Some of these exceptions also originated 
with the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, which states that: 
[A] possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to his 
invitees by a condition on the land, if, but only if, he (a) knows or by the 
exercise of reasonable care would discover the condition, and should 
realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such invitees, and 
(b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger, or will 
fail to protect themselves against it, and (c) fails to exercise reasonable 
care to protect them against the danger. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343 (1965). 
50 The exception applied if the landlord knew or should have known of the danger 
and a tenant, exercising due care, would not have discovered it, but if the tenant was aware of 
the danger, no landlord liability resulted. Johnson v. O’Brien, 105 N.W.2d 244, 246 (Minn. 
1960); Broughton v. Maes, 378 N.W.2d 134, 135 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985). 
51 Nubbe v. Hardy Cont’l Hotel Sys. of Minn., 31 N.W.2d 332, 334 (Minn. 1948) 
(discussing landlord liability for the failure to maintain areas of common use); see also 
Gradjelick v. Hance, 646 N.W.2d 225, 231 (Minn. 2002). 
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involving admission to the public;52 where the landlord undertook to perform 
repairs, but executed them negligently;53  and in some states, for defects 
constituting violations of building or housing codes.54 
The construction and application of the exceptions became more and 
more expansive but they did not overtake the no-repair and no liability 
rules.55 As public law intervened to shift the onus of care from tenant to 
landlord, landlords resorted to mechanisms still available through private 
ordering of affairs. The shrewd, self-interested landlord would require a 
prospective tenant to inspect the premises before the term commenced, 
thereby shifting back to the tenant, the onus of defects existing at inception, 
as well as those arising during the term. Finding no reason to look beyond 
the surface, these shifts were respected by the courts.56 
C.  Enter the Uniform Residential Landlord Tenant Act 
The URLTA attempted to facilitate the reorientation of the landlord-
tenant relation already underway. It has been officially adopted in fifteen 
states and enacted in part in eight more states.57 Among other things, the 
URLTA provides: 
 
                                                 
52 Broughton, 378 N.W.2d at 136. 
53 Id. 
54 Old Town, 349 N.E.2d at 754–55. 
55 Gradjelick, 646 N.W.2d at 232, n.4. 
56 See, e.g., Civale v. Meriden Hous. Auth., 192 A.2d 548, 550 (1963) (tenant 
bears the risks of defects discoverable upon reasonable inspection); see generally Note, 
Judicial Expansion Of Tenants’ Private Law Rights: Implied Warranties Of Habitability And 
Safety In Residential Urban Leases, 56 CORNELL L. Q. 489, 490 (1971) (“The tenant’s 
inspection was his only ‘warranty’ that the premises were suitable for their intended use.”); 
Charles J. Meyers, The Covenant of Habitability and the American Law Institute, 27 STAN. L. 
REV. 879, 899 (1975). 
57 For a table of jurisdictions that have adopted the U, see UNIFORM RESIDENTIAL 
LANDLORD TENANT ACT OF 1972, Editor’s Notes, Table of Jurisdictions Wherein the Act Has 
Been Adopted, 7B U.L.A. 285 (2010). They include: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Connecticut, 
Florida, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New 
Mexico, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and 
Washington. ALA. CODE §§ 35-9A-101 to 35-9A-603 (2014); ALASKA STAT. ANN. §§ 
34.03.010–34.03.380 (West 2014); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-1301–33-1381 (2014); 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 47a-1–47a-20a (West 2014); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 83.40–83.67 
(West 2014); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 521-1–521-78 (LexisNexis 2014); IOWA CODE ANN. 
§§ 562A.1–562A.37 (West 2014); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-2540–58-2573 (West 2014); KY. 
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 383.500–383.715 (LexisNexis 2014); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 
554.601–554.616 (West 2014); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 89-8-1–89-8-27 (2014); MONT. CODE 
ANN. §§ 70-24-101–70-24-442 (2014); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 76-1401–76-1449 
(LexisNexis 2014); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 47-8-1–47-6-52 (West 2014); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 
41, §§ 101–36 (West 2014); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 90.100–90.940 (West 2014); R.I. GEN. 
LAWS §§ 34-18-1–34-18-57 (West 2014); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 27-40-10–27-40-940 (2014); 
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 66-28-101–66-28-521 (2014); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-248.2–55-248.40 
(2014); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 59.18.010–59.18.430, 59.18.900 (LexisNexis 2014). 
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§ 2.104. [Landlord to Maintain Premises]. 
(a) A landlord shall: 
(2) Make all repairs and do whatever is necessary to put and 
keep the premises in a fit and habitable condition; 
* * * 
(4) Maintain in good and safe working order and condition 
all electrical, plumbing, sanitary, heating, ventilating, air-
conditioning, and other facilities and appliances ... supplied 
or required to be supplied by him[.]58 
Section 4.101(a) of the URLTA authorizes the tenant to provide 
written notice to a landlord who is not in compliance with the repair 
obligations that the lease will terminate if the condition is not corrected.59 
Section 4.101(b) allows the tenant to recover actual damages for the 
landlord’s noncompliance in addition to the remedies available under § 
4.101(a). 60  Section 1.105 also provides for the recovery of appropriate 
damages by the aggrieved party and the right to bring an action to enforce 
the rights and obligations declared by the act.61 While safety and habitability 
were expressly mentioned, there was a glaring omission—the URLTA did 
not expressly overrule the common law principles protecting a landlord from 
tort liability. Was the silence deliberate or a mere oversight? One 
commentator, Professor Bernhardt, believes it was the latter.62 He believes 
that the drafters “were so preoccupied with getting tenants the right to repair 
and deduct or to stay and pay less rent (under an implied warranty theory), or 
to quit (under a constructive eviction theory), that they were not also 
worrying about what tenants could do when untenantable conditions caused 
them personal injuries rather than economic discomfort.”63 Consequently, 
courts have had to “guess” at legislative intent.64    
III. THREE REGIMES: INTERSECTIONS, PARALLELS AND 
CONVERGENCE 
The URLTA and the implied warranty of habitability were new rules 
that radically changed the landscape of landlord-tenant relations. In this 
                                                 
58 URLTA § 2.104 (1972). 
59 URLTA § 4.101(a). 
60 URLTA § 4.101(b). 
61 URLTA § 1.105. 
62 Roger Bernhardt, Landlord and Torts, GOLDEN GATE UNIV. (Sept. 22, 2007, 
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section, I discuss how far the courts believed it altered that terrain—whether 
it should be read as merely recasting the relation from conveyance to 
contract or as effacing all that stood in the way of ensuring decent, habitable, 
and safe dwellings. 
In order to conceptualize the regimes that resulted from the 
URLTA’s failure to take a clear position on the landlord tort immunity rule, I 
employ an approach developed by Professor Hohfeld in which he classified 
all fundamental legal relations into eight categories of “jural opposites” and 
“jural correlatives.”65 By “jural opposite,” Hohfeld meant that one of the 
eight terms (or “conceptions”) entails the absence or “negation” of its 
opposite.66 Thus, the term “privilege” is the negation of the term “duty.”67 
For example, one who has a privilege to enter upon another’s land does not 
have a duty to remain off the land. 68  In Hohfeld’s conception two 
“[c]orrelatives express a single legal relation from the point of view of the 
two parties.”69 This schema provides a useful framework for examining the 
duty of care vis-à-vis the immunity rule, that is, whether the two rules are 
intersecting, parallel, or converging. What I mean by intersecting is that the 
two rules by import, conflict. One nullifies or defeats the purposes of the 
other. In this conception, the landlord’s obligation to repair obviates a right 
to evict a tenant for demanding repairs; it precludes a landlord’s entitlement 
to rent when repairs are not undertaken. The availability of summary 
possession proceedings precludes the landlord’s right to engage in self-help 
to evict a tenant.70 
By parallel rules, I mean that the two can co-exist alongside one 
another, one never nullifying, nor compromising the other. A landlord’s duty 
to repair can co-exist with a tenant’s duty to refrain from destructive, 
nuisance or unlawful activities on the premises. 
I use converging to describe rules that have discrete parts, may 
overlap in points, but are able to be harmonized toward a coherent purpose. 
For example, a landlord’s duty to repair converges with a tenant’s right to 
recover for personal injuries, but does not protect the tenant from eviction as 
a result of threatening to file unrelated personal injury lawsuits.71 
The discussion that follows shows that in attempting to reconcile the 
landlord’s duty to repair with the no tort liability rule, the states have fallen 
                                                 
65 Hohfeld, supra note 1, at 30. 
66 Id.; see generally Joseph W. Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical 
Jurisprudence from Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 975, 986 (1982). 
67 Hohfeld, supra note 1, at 30; Singer, supra note 66 at 986. 
68 Hohfeld, supra note 1, at 32; Singer, supra note 66 at 987. 
69 Hohfeld, supra note 1, at 33–36; see also Singer, supra note 66, at 987. 
70 See Jordan v. Talbot, 361 P.2d 20, 26 (Cal. 1961); Randy G. Gerchick, 
Comment, No Easy Way Out: Making The Summary Eviction Process A fairer and More 
Efficient Alternative to Landlord Self Help, 41 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 759, 764, 777 (1994). 
71 See Helfich v. Valdez Motel Corp., 207 P.3d 552, 559 (Alaska 2009) (holding 
that any tort claim under the URLTA must derive from the failure of the landlord to keep the 
premises fit and habitable; that it is not a general tort statute). 
11
Green: Paradoxes, Parallels and Fictions
Published by DigitalCommons@Hamline, 2015
418 HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:407 
into three regimes. In the first regime, some courts strike down one of the 
rules as intersecting and hence in conflict with prevailing values or 
legislative intent and private ordering is precluded. In the second regime, 
some courts allow the rules to operate in parallel to each other; a landlord’s 
liability for breach of duty to repair is limited to economic losses. And other 
courts, in the third regime, find familiar points of convergence; the duty to 
repair supplements common law rights. 
A.  The First Regime: Intersection/Conflict 
In this first regime, the courts have determined that the tort immunity 
rule intersects and conflicts with the no repair rule. In Sargent v. Ross, the 
New Hampshire Supreme Court pronounced the new rule that landlords, like 
all persons, “must act as reasonable person(s) under all . . . the 
circumstances,” impressing upon the landlord-tenant relationship general tort 
law principles. 72  This ruling did not rest upon one of the traditional 
exceptions to caveat lessee, but was found to be the natural extension of a 
prior holding, which had recognized an implied warranty of habitability in 
the landlord-tenant relationship.73 
In Sargent, a guest of the tenant, a four-year-old child whom the 
tenant was babysitting, was killed in a fall from an exterior stairway leading 
up to the tenant’s second floor apartment. 74  In a wrongful death action 
against the landlord, the child’s mother claimed that the stairs were too steep 
and that the railing on the stairway was inadequate.75 Attempting to bring the 
case within one of the recognized exceptions to landlord tort immunity, the 
plaintiff argued that the stairway constituted a common area, and that the 
landlord was responsible for its negligent construction and maintenance.76 
The landlord contended that the stairway was part of the leased premises, and 
was under the control of the tenant.77 The court declined to decide the case 
based on the traditional rule and its exceptions, instead announcing that the 
proper standard for landlord liability was one of ordinary negligence, 
requiring a landlord to act as a reasonable person under all of the 
                                                 
72 Sargent v. Ross, 308 A.2d 528, 534 (N.H. 1973). 
73 Id. at 533; see also Kline v. Burns, 276 A.2d 248 (N.H. 1971). Other courts 
that have followed Sargent include: Mansur v. Eubanks, 401 So.2d 1328 (Fla. 1981); 
Thompson v. Crownover, 381 S.E.2d 283 (Ga. 1989) (duty of care based on statutory 
warranty of habitability); Stephens v. Stearns, 678 P.2d 41 (Idaho 1984) (statutory implied 
warranty of habitability cited); Old Town, 349 N.E.2d at 762; Young v. Garwacki, 402 N.E.2d 
1045 (Mass. 1980) (reliance in part on warranty of habitability); Turpel v. Sayles, 692 P.2d 
1290 (Nev. 1985); Trentacost v. Brussel, 412 A.2d 436 (1980); Mariorenzi v. DiPonte, 333 
A.2d 127, 132 (R.I. 1975); Favreau v. Miller, 156 Vt. 222, 591 A.2d 68 (Vt. 1991); and 
Pagelsdorf v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 284 N.W.2d 55 (Wis. 1979) (relying on implied 
warranty of habitability). New Hampshire is not a URLTA state. 
74 Sargent, 308 A.2d at 529. 
75 Id. at 530. 
76 Id. at 530–31. 
77 Id. at 530. 
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circumstances, having regard for the likelihood of injury to others, the 
probable seriousness of such injuries, and the burden of reducing or avoiding 
the risk.78 Questions of control, common areas, and hidden defects were 
henceforth to be considered only as they “bear on the basic tort issues such 
as the foreseeability and unreasonableness of the particular risk of harm, but 
not as a bar to recovery per se.”79 
The court abolished specialized tests for landlord negligence because 
they tended to immunize individuals occupying the position of “landlord” 
from the “simple rules of reasonable conduct[,] which govern other persons 
in their daily activities.”80 Seeing the heart of the issue, the court noted that 
“[t]he ground of liability upon the part of a landlord when he demises 
dangerous property has nothing special to do with the relation of landlord 
and tenant. It is the ordinary case of liability for personal misfeasance, which 
runs through all the relations of individuals to each other.” 81  As such, 
“[g]eneral principles of tort law ordinarily impose liability upon persons for 
injuries caused by their failure to exercise reasonable care under all the 
circumstances.”82 Sargent thus clarified that what could be termed “landlord 
negligence” is simply an application of the common law principle that “[a] 
person is generally negligent for exposing another to an unreasonable risk of 
harm that foreseeably results in an injury.”83 It is the duty to repair under the 
implied warranty of habitability that moves the landlord-tenant relation away 
from strict property law rules to the realm of tort law, where the breach of 
duty gives rise to liability. 
In Turpel v. Sayles,84 the Nevada Supreme Court also abandoned the 
common law that narrowly defined duty: 
In accord with those courts which have discerned no sound 
policy reason in the modern social context for retaining the 
ancient exception for landlords or property owners from the 
general application of the basic principles of tort law, we 
find no basis for excusing the landlord in this case from the 
requirement that she defend the allegation that she has, 
through her negligence, been the cause of foreseeable 
injuries to the plaintiff for which she should assume 
                                                 
78 Id. at 534. 
79 Id. at 531. 
80 Sargent, 308 A.2d at 531. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 530. 
83 Id. 
84 Turpel v. Sayles, 692 P.2d 1290 (Nev. 1985). In Turpel, a fire erupted in an 
apartment. Id. The plaintiff was injured when she attempted to warn and rescue the occupants. 
Id. The plaintiff claimed her injuries were caused by the negligent failure of landlord to install 
smoke detector devices. Id. 
13
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liability.85 
The Wyoming Supreme Court, in Merrill v. Jansma, joined the 
movement abandoning the rule of landlord immunity, pointing out that the 
imposition of the legislatively created duty to maintain property in a safe and 
habitable condition gives rise to a new standard of care applicable in cases 
involving personal injuries occurring on rental property, i.e., reasonable care 
under the circumstances.86 Upon establishing that a breach of this standard 
proximately caused injury, the injured party is entitled to prove any damages 
recoverable in a personal injury claim.87 
1.  Section 2.104 Duty Negates Tort Immunity                                                                                                 
The URLTA states that have abandoned the no tort liability rule have 
done so on the express basis that it is inconsistent with the § 2.104 duty to 
maintain premises. In Newton v. Magill, the Alaska Supreme Court held that 
the traditional common law rule that a landlord is generally not liable for 
dangerous conditions in leased premises no longer applies in view of the 
legislature’s enactment of the URLTA.88 The court found it “inconsistent 
with a landlord’s continuing duty to repair premises imposed under the 
URLTA to exempt from tort liability a landlord who fails in this duty” given 
the legislative policy reasons behind the warranty of habitability, that is, safe 
and adequate housing, and in recognition of the fact that tenants are unable 
and unlikely to make repairs.89 
Not only does the statute perforce abolish common law tort 
immunity rule, a landlord may also be liable under negligence per se. 
Negligence per se results from a violation of statute or regulation adopted as 
                                                 
85 Id. at 1293. 
86 Merrill v. Jansma, 86 P.3d 270, 287 (Wyo. 2004). 
87 Id. at 289; see, e.g., Gradjelick, 646 N.W.2d at 232. However, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court has declined to extend this liability for injury resulting from a criminal attack 
on the basis that the landlord failed to install and maintain security measures. See Funchess v. 
Cecil Newman Corp., 615 N.W.2d 397 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000), rev’d, 632 N.W.2d 666 (Minn. 
2001). 
88 Newton v. Magill, 872 P.2d 1209, 1217 (Alaska 1994). 
89 Id. Some courts nonetheless read the statutory protections narrowly, 
consequently limiting the tort claims. In Helfrich, the Alaska Supreme Court clarified that any 
tort claim under the URLTA must derive from the failure of the landlord to keep the premises 
fit and habitable; that it is not a general tort statute. 207 P.3d at 559. There, a landlord sought 
to evict a tenant shortly after the tenant sued the landlord for injuries from a slip and fall on 
the premises. Id. at 554–55. The tenant alleged retaliatory eviction, but the court found that 
URLTA does not provide a claim for injuries in tort that are not based on rights and remedies 
granted the tenant under URLTA. Id. at 557–60. Alaska Statute 34.03.310(a)(2) therefore does 
not protect tenants from eviction if they threaten or file unrelated personal injury lawsuits. Id. 
at 559. 
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a standard of conduct. 90 In Edie v. Gray, a landlord was held liable under 
this theory for a condition that violated the Montana Residential Landlord-
Tenant Act.91 When the Edies rented a house from Gray, a stairwell light 
located on the landing between the upstairs and the basement was not 
functional.92 Edie, thinking she was at the bottom of the stairs, missed the 
last step and fell, severely breaking her ankle. 93  There was disputed 
testimony as to whether Edie had agreed to undertake the repair of the light, 
but absent a separate writing evidencing this undertaking, that duty to repair 
remained with the landlord.94 As such, the violation of the statute provided 
the basis for negligence per se liability.95 
The Ohio Supreme Court, in Shroades v. Rental Homes, Inc., ruled 
that a landlord’s violation of specified statutory duties constitutes negligence 
per se, but only where the landlord knows or should know of the factual 
circumstances that caused the violation. 96  The court read the Landlord-
Tenant Act97 as an integrated unit: § 5321.12 allowed recovery for damages 
for “the breach of any duty that is imposed by law” and § 5321.04 clearly 
imposed a duty to repair on landlords and to do whatever is necessary to put 
and keep the premises in a fit and habitable condition.98 The court concluded: 
In light of the public policy and drastic changes made by the 
statutory scheme of [the act], we hold that a landlord is 
liable for injuries, sustained on the demised residential 
premises, which are proximately caused by the landlord’s 
failure to fulfill the duties imposed by [§] 5321.04. We 
conclude that the General Assembly intended both to 
                                                 
90 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288B (providing that violation of 
statute or regulation adopted as a standard of conduct is “negligence in itself,” unless the 
violation is one of several “excused violations.”). 
91 Edie v. Gray, 121 P.3d 516, 521 (Mont. 2005). 
92 Id. at 518. 
93 Id. According to the plaintiff, the injury was so severe that she was forced to 
quit her job and continued to cause her pain. Id. 
94 Id. at 518–19. The Montana RLTA required the landlord to maintain in good 
and safe working order, all electrical, plumbing, sanitary, heating and other facilities, but also 
provided that the parties could agree in a separate writing that the tenant will perform 
specified repairs. Id. at 519–20. 
95 Id. at 520. The court stated that the RLTA was intended to protect renters, and 
the plaintiff was a renter; slip and falls were the sort of injury the statute was designed to 
prevent, and this was a slip and fall; and the RLTA was intended to regulate rental property 
landowners. Edie, 121 P.3d at 520. The landlord’s attempt to avoid liability on the basis that 
the tenant did not notify him of the defect was to no avail, since the court found that RLTA 
imposed a duty of repair upon the landlord, but did not impose a duty to notify upon the 
tenant. Id. at 521. 
96 Shroades v. Rental Homes, Inc.,427 N.E.2d 774, 778 (Ohio 1981). In Shump v. 
First Continental-Robinwood Assocs., the Ohio Supreme Court extended the landlord’s 
liability to guests of tenants. 644 N.E.2d 291, 296 (Ohio 1994), 
97 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.04 (West 2012). 
98 Shroades, 427 N.E.2d at 777. 
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provide tenants with greater rights and to negate the previous 
tort immunities for landlords.99 
Considering the purposes of the statute in the first place—to protect 
persons using rented residential premises from injuries—this conclusion is 
compelling.100 “There is increasing recognition of the fact that the tenant who 
leases defective premises is likely to be impecunious and unable to make the 
necessary repairs.”101 
2.  Section 2-104 Duty to Repair Resists Private Ordering 
The Idaho Supreme Court, in a series of cases, construed its 
landlord-tenant statute not only to replace common law rules, but also to 
insure that the new standards would be applied, precluded private bargaining 
around the rights. In Jesse v. Lindsley, it ruled that a clause in a lease 
purporting to exculpate a landlord from liability for personal injuries arising 
from conditions in the leased property was unenforceable.102 In doing so, it 
traced the path of the court to its current position on landlord tort liability.103 
First, in Worden v. Ordway, the court declined to adopt a common law 
implied warranty of habitability, based on the Legislature’s enactment of a 
statutory warranty of habitability.104 That court explained: 
The Idaho legislature has already acted in this area and 
enacted a statutory version of the implied warranty of 
habitability theory. I.C. § 6-320. This Court should refrain 
from changing or expanding a common law rule, where the 
legislature has already acted in the same area.105 
Section 6–320 constituted a statutory version of the judicially 
implied warranty of habitability that was applied in Stephens v. Stearns.106 
There, the court considered the landlord’s liability where a tenant was 
                                                 
99 Id. at 777–78. 
100 Id. at 778; see also Miller v. David Grace, Inc., 212 P.3d 1223, 1230 (Okla. 
2009) (rejecting caveat lessee and imposing a duty to maintain the leased premises, including 
the areas under tenant’s exclusive control and use in reasonably safe condition; and imposing 
liability for injuries resulting from a failure to fulfill that duty). 
101 Shroades, 427 N.E.2d at 777. 
102 Jesse v. Lindsley, 233 P.3d 1, 5 (Idaho 2008). 
103 Id. at 5–7. 
104 Worden v. Ordway, 672 P.2d 1049, 1053 (Idaho 1983). 
105 Id. Under I.C. § 6-320(a)(1), (2), (3) and (6), a landlord is obligated to keep the 
premises in reasonably waterproofed and weatherproofed condition; maintain in good working 
order electrical, plumbing, heating, ventilating, cooling, or sanitary facilities supplied by the 
landlord; maintain the premises in a manner not hazardous to the health or safety of the tenant; 
and maintain smoke detectors. I.C. § 6-320(a)(1)–(3), (6) (2015). 
106 Stephens v. Stearns, 678 P.2d 41 (Idaho 1984). 
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injured after falling in a stairway that provided access to her apartment.107 
The court noted that under the common law, a landlord was generally not 
liable to the tenant for any damage resulting from dangerous conditions 
existing at the time of the leasing.108 However, the court stated, “[W]e today 
decide to leave the common-law rule and its exceptions behind, and we adopt 
the rule that a landlord is under a duty to exercise reasonable care in light of 
all the circumstances.”109 The court noted, “Our embracement of this rule is 
further supported by our legislature’s enactment of a statutory version of the 
implied warranty of habitability, I.C. § 6-320.”110 Implicit in this stance was 
that this duty was intended to prevent the rental of unsafe conditions and to 
make landlords liable for injuries flowing from such conditions. 
The Idaho Supreme Court again visited the issue in Stevens v. 
Fleming, wherein the surviving daughters of a deceased residential tenant 
were seeking damages from the landlord for their decedent’s death in an 
apartment fire.111 The Court stated: 
A landlord is required to exercise reasonable care to his 
tenants in light of all the circumstances. In adopting the 
reasonable care standard for landlords in Stearns . . . the 
Idaho Supreme Court noted by way of footnote that its 
holding was supported by a statutory version of the implied 
warranty of habitability, I.C. § 6–320. When applicable, 
specific statutory provisions such as the Uniform Fire Code 
may prove useful in delineating minimum standards which 
are binding upon every owner of a rented premises. Such on 
point code provisions provide a ready measure of the base 
standard of care and failure to meet such standards may be 
negligence per se if the statutes or ordinances were designed 
to prevent the type of harm which occurred.112 
Thus, the rule derived in Lindsley is that a landlord must exercise 
reasonable care under the circumstances for the protection of his residential 
tenant. This includes the duty under I.C. § 6-320 to maintain the premises in 
a manner that is not hazardous to the health or safety of the tenant.113 To 
enforce the exculpatory clause would conflict with the established policy for 
landlords to provide safe habitation for their tenants, separate and apart from 
                                                 
107 Id. at 44. 
108 Id. at 49. 
109 Id. at 50. 
110 Id. at 50 n.3. (citing Worden v. Ordway, 672 P.2d 1049 (Idaho 1983)). 
111 Stevens v. Fleming, 777 P.2d 1196, 1197–98 (Idaho 1989). 
112 Id. at 1198–99 (citations omitted). 
113 Lindsley, 1233 P.3d at 6. 
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the issue of whether one may recover under the specific provisions of I.C. § 
6-320.114 
B.  The Second Regime: Parallels—No Tort Liability Rule Survives 
Courts in the second regime find that the duty to repair can operate 
in parallel with tort immunity. In the end of this section, I show how the 
reasoning of these courts is not credibly supported by principle or logic. 
In Tolbert v. Jamison, a rental house had only one door for ingress 
and egress.115 Two of three tenants died in a house fire, intentionally started 
by a third party, which blocked the only egress.116 The third tenant escaped 
through a window.117 Relatives of the deceased tenants brought an action 
against the landlords, alleging, among other things, “negligence in failing to 
provide appropriate ingress and egress, working fire alarms, and fire 
extinguishers or other extinguishing equipment.”118 The tenants lost on all 
accounts. 119  First, the tenants failed to show any duties owed under the 
express terms of the lease.120 They failed to establish any violation of any 
regulations requiring fire alarms and extinguishers.121 Finally, there could be 
no liability under Nebraska common law because a landlord does not 
otherwise warrant the fitness or safety of the premises; the tenant takes them 
as she finds them.122 
The court also rejected liability based on premises liability because 
the landlord was not in possession. 123  It explained that the duties of a 
landowner to those lawfully on the premises—to protect from harmful 
conditions or dangerous activities on the land, and “from accidental, 
negligent, and intentionally harmful acts of third parties if those acts are 
foreseeable”—only applied to a possessor of the land who is in occupation 
with the intent to control.124 Because the landlord was not in control, there 
could be no liability.125 While a landlord can be bound to use reasonable care 
in the maintenance of common areas over which he or she retains control and 
has not demised to the tenant, there were no common areas in a single-family 
dwelling.126 Thus, the court found that absent a statute, covenant, fraud, or 
                                                 
114 See Hilder, 478 A.2d at 208; N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW §235-b (2015) (Warranty 
of Habitability). 




119 See id. at 886. 
120 Id. at 883. 
121 Tolbert, 794 N.W.2d at 882. 
122 Id. at 885. The court engaged in a discussion of the common law because the 
tenants did not raise the statute until the appeal. Id. at 884–85. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. at 884. 
125 Id. 
126 Tolbert, 794 N.W.2d at 885. 
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concealment a landlord who gives a tenant full control and possession of the 
leased property will not be liable for personal injuries sustained by the tenant 
or other person lawfully upon the leased property.127 Instead, “[t]o hold an 
owner of leased premises liable for injuries suffered as a result of the 
condition of the leased premises, it must appear that the landlord had a right 
to present possession or present control or dominion thereover.”128 
1.  Section 2.104 Duty Does Not Impact Tort Immunity 
Some years earlier, the Nebraska Court of Appeals took up the 
question of the impact of the URLTA on the no tort liability rule. In Tighe v. 
Cedar Lawn, Inc., the court explained that the legislature had enacted the 
URLTA but had since substantially modified it, including adding a provision 
that stated, “The obligations imposed by this section are not intended to 
change existing tort law in the state.”129 The court explained that while the 
URLTA has provided a cause of action for damages in the event of breach of 
duty defined by the Nebraska landlord tenant law, a review of the entire act 
showed that it was designed to ensure that the premises are habitable, not to 
create a tort action for damages, which did not previously exist.130 The court 
went on to note the policy underlying the URLTA—“in addition to making 
uniform, clarifying, simplifying and modernizing the law . . . to encourage 
landlord[s] . . . to maintain and improve the quality of housing.”131 However, 
the landlord’s obligation to maintain the premises focused on the landlord’s 
duty to maintain habitability, not on any tort duty.132 In fact, quite simply, the 
court stated that the URLTA “really is designed to assist tenants whose 
landlords fail to provide the basic necessities which make a dwelling unit 
habitable.” 133  Tenants were relegated to recovery of economic losses. 134 
Finding no language that identified poor quality housing to harbor dangerous 
                                                 
127 Id. One non-URLTA state has expressly retained caveat lessee by statute. In 
2006, the Arkansas Legislature enacted ARK. CODE ANN. §18-16-110, stating that “[n]o 
landlord or agent or employee of a landlord shall be liable to a tenant or a tenant’s licensee or 
invitee for death, personal injury, or property damage proximately caused by any defect or 
disrepair on the premises absent the landlord’s: (1) Agreement supported by consideration or 
assumption by conduct of a duty to undertake an obligation to maintain or repair the leased 
premises; and (2) Failure to perform the agreement or assumed duty in a reasonable manner.” 
ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-16-110 (West 2014). 
128 Tolbert, 794 NW.2d at 885 
129 Tighe v. Cedar Lawn, Inc., 649 N.W.2d 520 (Neb. 2002) (quoting NEB. REV. 
STAT. § 76-1419 (2014)). 
130 Tighe, 649 N.W.2d at 527. Section 76-1419 requires a landlord to make all 
repairs and do whatever is necessary, after written or actual notice, to put and keep the 
premises in a fit and habitable condition. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1419. 
131 Tighe, 649 N.W.2d at 527. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. at 529. 
134 Id. at 531. 
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conditions, the court could find no legislative intent to give tenants remedies 
for injuries from such dangerous conditions.135 
The Virginia Supreme Court was equally convinced that under 
Virginia’s version of the URLTA the statutory duty to repair did not override 
the common law no tort liability rule, but that the two could exist 
concurrently. In Isbell v. Commercial Inv. Assocs., Inc., the court found the 
question to be one of first impression—whether the VRLTA abrogates the 
common law and provides a tenant with a statutory cause of action in tort 
against a landlord for personal injuries from violations of obligations 
imposed by the Act. 136  Nowhere in the statutory text was there express 
language creating a cause of action.137 Nor could the court find such liability 
necessarily implied.138 Instead, the court found the comments to the URLTA 
instructive, that is, that the counterpart to Virginia Code § 55-248.13(A)(1), 
“follows the warranty of habitability doctrine.”139 As such, “warranty” was a 
contract duty, not a duty grounded in tort, with remedies more akin to those 
in an action for breach of contract as opposed to those for personal injury.140 
Therefore, the VRLTA imposed contractual duties on landlords, but it did 
not impose a tort duty with regard to the responsibility to maintain and repair 
leased premises under the enjoyment and control of the lessee.141 Neither 
would any contract duty undertaken by a landlord to repair leased premises 
under a tenant’s control render a landlord liable in tort for injuries sustained 
by the tenant as a result of landlord’s breach of covenant to make such 
repairs.142 Recovery for a breach of covenant is the cost of repairs, the loss 
suffered by the tenant after lapse of a reasonable time from giving the notice 
in which to make repairs,143 or the difference between the agreed rent and the 
fair rental value of the premises as they were during their occupancy by the 
tenant in the unsafe, unsanitary, or unfit condition.144 
Although yet to be decided by the Kentucky Supreme Court, the 
court of appeals has had several occasions to consider and resolve the 
apparent conflict between the common law no tort liability rule and the 
statutory duty to repair. Each time, it has resolved the question in favor of 
preserving the no liability rule. First, in Pinkston v. Audubon Area Cmty. 
                                                 
135 Id. at 527. 
136 Isbell v. Commercial Inv. Assocs., Inc., 644 S.E.2d 72, 74 (Va. 2007). There, 
the tenant fell down worn and slippery stairs located inside a leased apartment. Id. at 73. 
137 Id. at 76. 
138 Id. at 77. 
139 Id. at 76. 
140 Id. 
141 Isbell, 644 S.E.2d at 76. 
142 Id. at 75. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. at 76. In Steward v. Holland Family Properties, LLC, the Virginia Supreme 
Court reiterated that holding and ruled that the VRLTA also did not provide a basis for a 
negligence per se liability, rejecting a claim by a child for injuries caused by lead poisoning 
from the paint within the rented apartment. 726 S.E.2d 251, 255 (Va. 2012). 
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Servs., Inc., the lease did not specifically require the landlord to maintain the 
premises, but stated that the landlord would ‘‘make necessary repairs with 
reasonable promptness.’’ 145  After moving into the apartment, the tenant 
noticed an oily substance on the stairwell steps and discovered that the 
stairwell handrail was loose.146 After several requests to the landlord to repair 
the handrail were ignored, the tenant was injured when she grabbed the 
handrail and it pulled from the wall.147 The court recited the general law that 
“[i]n the absence of a special agreement to do so, made when the contract is 
entered into, there is no obligation upon the landlord to repair the leased 
premises.”148 The court further stated, “[l]ikewise, a landlord will not be 
liable for injuries caused by defects in the leased premises unless the 
condition is unknown to the tenant and not discoverable through reasonable 
inspection.”149 Since the condition was obvious and known to tenant for 
several weeks before she fell, the landlord was not liable.150 Moreover, the 
court explained, “[E]ven assuming that the lease provision imposed an 
affirmative duty on [the landlord] to make repairs, we cannot find that [it] is 
liable for personal injuries arising from its breach of the agreement to 
repair.”151 Instead, liability would be limited to the cost of repair.152 
In Miller v. Cundiff, where a loose carpet caused a tenant’s fall in her 
apartment, recovery for personal injuries was denied against the landlord 
because the tenant was aware of the carpet’s condition when she initially 
walked through the apartment and at the time of her fall.153 The court not 
only reaffirmed the law as recited in Pinkston, but also rejected the 
contention that the URLTA abrogated the common law, reasoning that ‘‘the 
URLTA was intended to supplement, not replace the common law.’’ 154 
Additionally, the court pointed out that Kentucky had not adopted the 
URLTA on a statewide basis and “a piecemeal abrogation of the common 
law would violate the constitutional provisions against local or special 
legislation.”155 Miller found the reasoning of other cases from other states 
unpersuasive, faulting them for failing to mind the principle that legislative 
intent to abrogate the common law must be clearly apparent and not 
presumed.156 As it interpreted the Act, the tenant has a cause of action for the 
cost of repair and, said the court quite assuredly, “this result preserves the 
                                                 
145 Pinkston v. Audubon Area Cmty. Servs., Inc., 210 S.W.3d 188, 189 (Ky. Ct. 
App. 2006). 
146 Id. 
147 Id. at 190. 
148 Id. (citing Miles v. Shauntee, 664 S.W.2d 512, 518 (Ky. 1983)). 
149 Id. 
150 Id. 
151 Pinkston, 210 S.W.3d at 190. 
152 Id. 
153 Miller v. Cundiff, 245 S.W.3d 786, 787 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007). 




Green: Paradoxes, Parallels and Fictions
Published by DigitalCommons@Hamline, 2015
428 HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:407 
effectiveness of the URLTA’s enforcement provision, but also incorporates 
the common law rule.”157 
In True v. Fath Bluegrass Manor Apartment, in rejecting a claim for 
recovery from negligent repairs, the court reviewed the rules enunciated in 
Pinkston, concluding that in Kentucky a landlord is not liable for personal 
injuries growing out of the failure to repair.158 The court explained that as in 
any other contract, the breach of a repair agreement does not extend the 
landlord’s liability beyond damages outside of the reasonable contemplation 
of the parties.159 While a negligent repair claim is premised on the tenant’s 
reliance on the appearance that a defect had been remedied, recovery should 
be available only if a repair resulted in an increased danger that was 
unknown to the tenant or if the negligent repair gave the deceptive 
appearance of safety. 160  The court found the facts undisputedly to the 
contrary.161 
2.  A Parallel Existence Revives the Common Law Paradox 
The problem with the reasoning by these courts is that it is myopic 
and formal. They employ the classic form of deductive reasoning: a lease is a 
contract; a breach of contract gives rise to monetary damages; therefore a 
breach of lease entitles the tenant to monetary damages. In a valid deductive 
argument, the conclusion follows necessarily (conclusively, with certainty) 
from the premise.162 If the premises are true then the conclusion must be true 
also. 163  But when the argument begins with a faulty premise, then the 
                                                 
157 Id. 
158 True v. Fath Bluegrass Manor Apartment, 358 S.W.3d 23, 25–27 (Ky. Ct. App. 
2011). There, the court ruled that Landlord had no duty to repair loose railing on an apartment 
balcony, and thus was not liable for injuries sustained by a tenant who fell from the balcony, 
absent a showing of a reasonably foreseeable distraction that caused the tenant to fail to 
discover the obvious defect in the balcony, forget its existence, or fail to protect against its 
danger, and where tenant was aware of the defective condition of the balcony railing when he 
initially walked through the apartment and at the time of his fall. Id. at 28. 
159 Id. at 26 (citing Dice’s Admin’r v. Zweigart’s Admin’r, 171 S.W. 195 (Ky. 
1914)). This holding remains a generally accepted principle for recovering damages arising 
from a breach of contract. See Univ. of Louisville v. RAM Eng’g & Constr., Inc., 199 S.W.3d 
746, 748 (Ky. Ct. App. 2005). 
160 Id. at 27. 
161 Id. “[The tenants] testified that they were aware that the railing was loose 
because screws were missing. They further testified that after they moved in but prior to the 
fall, Fath had not repaired the railing. Thus, this is not a negligent repair claim. The applicable 
law is that a tenant takes the premises in “as is” condition and the landlord is only liable for 
injuries caused by defects unknown to the tenant and not discoverable through reasonable 
inspection.” Id. There was, moreover, no evidence that the tenant was distracted from his 
“duty to act reasonably to ensure [his] own safety, heightened by [his] familiarity with the 
location and the arguably open and obvious nature of the danger.” Id. at 28. 
162 IRVING M. COPI, INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC 3–34 (4th ed. 1972). 
163 Id. 
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conclusion cannot follow.164 The fallacy in the reasoning lies in the courts’ 
conception of the tenants’ interest in the contract.165 If that interest were 
conceived more broadly—a safe place to live—then the argument collapses. 
Instead, their narrow conception serves not to facilitate the enjoyment of the 
essence of the parties’ interests under the lease, but to negate them.166  
The starting premise also ignored the fact that the URLTA was 
meant as a remedial measure—to improve the sorry plight of the poor 
residential tenant—by giving her rights in the landlord-relation and express 
remedies toward their fulfillment. Those remedies should be construed to 
ensure not only that the tenant receive an economic value equivalent to the 
rent paid for the premises, but also to ensure the tenant does not suffer the 
effects of unsafe housing. Circumscribing the reach of the URLTA to 
economic losses operates to negate its remedial purposes.   
The facile resolution of the tension between the statutory duty to 
repair and the common law no tort liability cannot be excused by the maxim 
to construe legislation as consistent with common law, if doing so nullifies 
the legislation.167 Instead, statutes that are remedial, as the URLTA, rather 
than narrowly, should be liberally construed.168 A remedial statute is one that 
affords a remedy, or improves or facilitates remedies already existing, for the 
enforcement of rights or redress of wrongs.169 
The statutory duty to repair should be read not only to reach conduct 
directly within its language, but also conduct that would thwart is essential 
purposes.170  If we examine the duty to repair under Professor Hohfeld’s 
schema, we see that it gives rise to a correlative right in the tenant to compel 
repairs.171 If a landlord, not fulfilling this duty also would escape liability for 
the consequences of this failure, surely the right in the tenant is meaningless, 
                                                 
164 Id. at 147–50. 
165 See discussion of cases supra Part III.B.1. 
166 See discussion of cases supra Part III.B.1. 
167 This rule arose at a time when the common law was viewed as the perfection of 
wisdom and attempts by the English Parliament to alter it were viewed with suspicion. See 
generally R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Statutes in Derogation of the Common Law: In the Georgia 
Supreme Court, 53 MERCER L. REV. 41 (2001); see also 3 NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND, 
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 61.01 (5th ed. 1992). 
168 SINGER supra note 167, at § 61.03. 
169 Ayers-Schaffer v. Solomon, 461 A.2d 396, 399 (R.I. 1983); Esposito v. O’Hair, 
886 A.2d 1197 (R.I. 2005); Kentucky Ins., Guar. Ass’n v. Jeffers, 13 S.W.3d 606, 609 (Ky. 
2000) (“[A] remedial statute must be so construed as to make it effect the evident purposes for 
which it was enacted, so that if the reason of the statute extends to past transactions, as well as 
to those in the future, then it will be so applied although the statute does not in terms so direct, 
unless to do so would impair some vested right or violate some constitutional guaranty.”); 
Martin v. Indiana, 774 N.E.2d 43, 45 (Ind. 2002) (“When a remedial statute is involved, a 
court must construe it to effect the evident purpose for which it was created.”) (internal 
quotations and citations omitted). 
170 See Jones v. Alfred Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 438–39 (1968) (The Thirteenth 
Amendment meant to eradicate all badges and incidents of slavery and thus statutes passed 
pursuant to the amendment could reach even private discrimination). 
171 See Hohfeld supra note 1. 
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for he would have suffered the circumstances that the right was designed to 
insure against. Awarding monetary damages will not fulfill that right any 
more than the right to be free from racial discrimination is fulfilled by money 
damages, and not by compelling the rental. Otherwise, the right (to live 
where one chooses) is entirely frustrated. If the landlord holds the only key 
to a safe place to live, the tenant’s expectation in safety and well-being 
cannot be fulfilled by money damages in the amount of reduction in the 
value of the premise. 
These courts read the rules as if they each operated in their own 
defined universes, with the inevitable consequence that overarching policy 
may be relegated to the perimeters.172 Since the one does not overrule the 
other, technically both can apply to each circumstance, but practically, the 
old rule cancels out the new. 
C.  Convergence: No Tort Liability Rule Qualified by Statutory 
Requirements 
In this third regime, the courts have declined to wholly abrogate 
common rules, but strive to harmonize them, based upon compelling policy 
and legislative intent. Davis v. Campbell is an example of clever reasoning to 
find a credible synthesis between the common law and statutory 
imperatives.173 There, in a rental house, “heat transmitting through chimney 
bricks in a fireplace caused a fire that destroyed the house.”174 To hold the 
landlord liable in negligence, it was necessary to show knowledge of the 
defective condition, but at the time, neither the tenant, nor the landlord had 
experienced any problems with the fireplace and neither was aware that its 
condition presented a fire hazard.175 While acknowledging that the state’s 
landlord-tenant law did not abrogate the common law rule of negligence that 
required knowledge of the hazard by the landlord, the court pointed out that 
the state statute created statutory duties that gave rise to liability that was 
distinct from common law negligence.176 
1.  Section 2.104 Duty Can Be Harmonized with Tort Immunity 
Essentially, the court ruled in Campbell that the common law existed 
alongside the Oregon Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (ORLTA).177 
This meant that a tenant may bring a statutory claim under the ORLTA, a 
common-law negligence claim, or both. 178  With respect to the statutory 
                                                 
172 See cases cited in text accompanying notes 115–161. 
173 Davis v. Campbell, 965 P.2d 1017 (Or. 1998). 
174 Id. at 1018. 
175 Id. 
176 Id. 
177 Id. at 1021. 
178 Id. 
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claim, the court held the fact that the legislature did not incorporate elements 
of common-law negligence into the statute did not preclude them; instead, it 
indicated its intent that tenants’ remedies under the act not be conditioned 
upon proof of such elements.179 As such, the court would not read into the act 
a requirement that the landlord have actual or constructive knowledge of an 
unsafe condition in order to be liable for personal injury to the tenant if the 
condition otherwise fell within the statutory duty.180 
The Washington Court of Appeals, in Tucker v. Hayford, also 
applied common law principles governing personal injury claims in the 
landlord-tenant relationship while simultaneously allowing claims for 
personal injuries by tenants based upon the Washington Residential 
Landlord-Tenant Act.181 In reaching this result, the court emphasized that the 
provision of the Washington act taken from the URLTA authorized the 
tenant to bring an action in an appropriate court for any remedy provided 
under the act or otherwise provided by law.182 These two jurisdictions found 
that rather than displace the common law, the URLTA created a regime that 
could converge with the common law and offer better protection to tenants. 
IV.  WRITING THE NEW PARADIGM 
In this section, I discuss how the momentum of the revolution, rather 
than being exhausted, can continue on to what I believe is its logical end, that 
is, imposing tort liability upon landlords for failure to fulfill the duty to 
repair, through strategic tools for legal analysis. While the URLTA was an 
overt change in the law on the duty of the landlord to repair, law often moves 
more covertly. A sub silento movement is often necessary to preserve the 
semblance of stability, but move nonetheless, in order to do justice in cases 
not fairly resolved within the old regime. A variety of strategic tools have 
long been at the court’s disposal for this movement sub silento, including the 
                                                 
179 Campbell, 965 P.2d at 1020. 
180 Id. at 1019; see also Humbert v. Sellars, 708 P.2d 344 (Or. 1985) (but for 
certain exceptions—which were not applicable in the case—a landlord is not liable to a tenant 
or any others who have entered onto the premises for harm caused by any condition that was 
present when the tenant took possession). 
181 Tucker v. Hayford, 75 P.3d 980, 984–85 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003). In adopting 
this position, the Washington Court of Appeals, definitively rejected an earlier ruling, 
Dexheimer v. CDS, Inc., 17 P.3d 641 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001), that declined to find tort 
liability, instead limiting tenants to those remedies specifically enumerated in the Act, 
including reduction in rent, repair and deduct and termination of the lease. Tucker, 75 P.3d at 
985. It also seemed to obviate the circuitous method of establishing a claim for personal injury 
outlined in Lian v. Stalick, 25 P.3d 467 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001). Tucker, 75 P.3d at 984. In 
Lian, the court found that the Residential Landlord Tenant Act (“RLTA”) could not support an 
award for personal injury damages, but that the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY: 
LANDLORD AND TENANT, § 17.6 (1977) provided such a remedy where tenant could show the 
landlord failed to repair a dangerous condition found to constitute a breach of habitability 
under RLTA. 25 P.3d 467, 474–75 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001). 
182 Tucker, 75 P.3d at 985. 
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process of distinguishing the ratio decidendi of cases,183 resort to equitable 
principles184 and the employment of legal fictions.185 
A legal fiction is a device that facilitates “shape shifting” in the law, 
superficially remaining the same while the substantive meaning slowly 
changes. 186  Sometimes the change is synthetic, that is, the alterations 
comprise embellishments or refinements to an essentially unchanged core. 
Sometimes the alterations radically upset existing understandings. As 
Professor Maine once explained, that term, “legal fiction” signifies: 
[A]ny assumption which conceals, or affects to conceal, the 
fact that a rule of law has undergone alteration, its letter 
remaining unchanged, its operation being modified.... It is 
not difficult to understand why fictions in all their forms are 
particularly congenial to the infancy of society. They satisfy 
the desire for improvement, which is not quite wanting, at 
the same time that they do not offend the superstitious 
disrelish for change which is always present.187 
Fictions are prominent in property law—constructive delivery for 
gifts, constructive possession of animals upon the land; the unity of person in 
husband and wife for the tenancy by the entirety; constructive notice from 
recorded instruments.188 While on appearance, they may seem like devices 
for obfuscation or trickery, they are in actuality valuable devices for adding 
flexibility in the law and for addressing the problems generated when rules 
clash with the demands of individual justice.189 
                                                 
183 REGINALD WALTER MICHAEL DIAS, JURISPRUDENCE 140–48 (5th ed. 1985). 
184 Equity intervened to moderate the sometimes harsh impacts of the law. During 
its early history, it operated in parallel to the legal system, equity operating on the person, 
leaving the law intact. PETER CHARLES HOFFER, THE LAW’S CONSCIENCE (1990). Two familiar 
maxims of equity are that equity regards substance, not form and equity abhors a forfeiture. 
Id. at 11. These have played a substantial role in the reshaping certain property interests. In the 
case of land sale contracts, on the vendee’s breach, rather than suffering forfeiture of all that 
was paid as well as the land, courts regarded the relation as mortgagor/mortgagee requiring 
the vendor to foreclose the vendee’s interest. Skendzel v. Marshall, 301 N.E.2d 641, 645 (Ind. 
1973); Bean v. Walker, 95 A.D.2d 70, 74-75 (4th Dep’t. 1983) 
185 LON FULLER, THE ANATOMY OF LAW 52 (1976). 
186 See Louise Harmon, Falling Off the Vine: Legal Fictions and the Doctrine of 
Substituted Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 1, 2–3 (1990). 
187 HENRY S. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 21–22 (17th ed. 1901). 
188 See generally John V. Orth, Fact & Fiction in the Law of Property, 11 GREEN 
BAG 2D 65 (2007). 
189 Id. at 75. Professor Orth states: “The Rule of Law, humanity’s best effort so far 
to produce justice on a regular basis, requires rules, but because of their rigidity and 
generality, rules can produce injustice in individual cases.” Id. at 79. 
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A.  Fictions in Landlord-Tenant Law 
In landlord-tenant law, legal fictions are both ancient and modern.190 
An example of an ancient fiction is constructive eviction. At early common 
law, even though a landlord did not physically enter and remove the tenant 
from the premises, he could yet be found to have evicted the tenant, 
constructively, if he created conditions (such as noise, soot, or flooding) that 
unreasonably interfered with the tenant’s use and enjoyment of the 
premises.191 A modern fiction is the treatment of an otherwise peaceable 
entry by the landlord to evict, in a tenant’s absence, but done without 
permission, as “force and violence” under unlawful detainer statutes. 192 
Indeed, the re-characterization of the landlord-tenant relationship by courts 
and by the URLTA, from one grounded solely in property law, to one more 
in contract with the attendant reciprocal rights and liabilities is in large part a 
fiction.193 Given the circumstances of the parties to the typical lease, the 
glaring unequal positions—the poor, unsophisticated and unsuspecting tenant 
on the one side and the shrewd landowner on the other—the notion that the 
result is a bargained-for exchange borders more on fantasy than reality.194 
                                                 
190 Indeed, the exceptions to caveat lessee, discussed supra at text accompanying 
notes 49 to 55 can be conceived as fictions, to the extent that they depart from the literal 
circumstances of the parties positions. 
191 Reste Realty Corp., 251 A.2d at 274–75. 
192 Talbot, 361 P. 2d 20; Berg v. Wiley, 264 N.W. 2d 145 (Minn. 1978). 
193 A central distinction between contract and property is that with contract, the 
parties are free to create legally enforceable interests, largely as they see fit, with limited legal 
constraints. In contrast, with property, the law enforces only those interests that conform to a 
determined set of forms, not recognizing novel forms or incidents. See Thomas W. Merrill & 
Henry G. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus 
Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 8 (2000). These principles, however, cannot be taken to mean that 
contract and property rules are forever fixed and do not respond to social, political and 
economic imperatives. Indeed, if we trace the history of contract law, we see the movement 
from the equitable conception of contract to the will theory and laissez-faire. See Samuel 
Williston, Freedom of Contract, 6 CORNELL L.Q. 365, 366 (1921); Morris R.Cohen, The Basis 
of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553, 574–75 (1933). Under the equitable conception, contracts 
were evaluated for their intrinsic fairness. The will theory of contract held that the law of 
contract gives expression to and protected the will of the parties, because the will is something 
inherently worthy of respect. Indeed, only if their wills were somehow manifested in the 
exchange would a contract be said to be formed, such that at the end of the eighteenth century 
to the beginning of the nineteenth, the idea arose that there must be a meeting of the minds for 
a valid enforceable contract. The will became the source of all the terms of the contract, so 
much so that the only source of the implied terms which might be read into a contract was the 
will of the parties. Id. at 576–77. So too, has the conception of property rights moved from 
Blackstone’s “despotic dominion” to one embodying social obligations. See Gregory 
Alexander, The Social Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 745, 
754 (2009). 
194 See discussion, infra Part IV.A.1 on the adoption of the implied warranty of 
habitability. Other new rights include the right to process before eviction, the right to have the 
security deposit held in segregated, interest-bearing account, the right to have the landlord 
mitigate damages and the right to assign the lease absent expressed reasonable grounds by the 
landlord. See, e.g., Lesar, supra note 6; see also David A. Super, in The Rise and Fall of the 
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In any case, by this new conception, the relation became shaped 
almost as much by implied terms—those based upon what the courts 
described as the presumed intentions of the astute, self-interested 
everyman—as by express terms or fixed rules. These presumed intentions, 
though, were infused with various public policy—particularly the need to 
address the social evil of slums.195 This gave rise to, among other things, the 
implied warranty of habitability, creating a right to a habitable dwelling 
during the lease term. 196  Thus, through legal fictions, the fundamental 
characteristics and outward form were retained—the respective interests of 
landlord and tenant, types of tenancies recognized, how created, how 
terminated—and the relation of landlord and tenant inter se in the post 
revolution era, was radically transformed. 
1.  The Fiction of Control from the Duty to Repair  
A legal fiction of control can be employed to overrule the landlord 
tort immunity rule. It seems that the rule rested in large part upon the fact of 
an absence of control by the landlord over the leased premises. Under the 
theory of premises liability, a landlord has a duty to maintain property he 
controls in a reasonably safe manner, else be liable to those who are injured 
while in the area under his control.197 The converse of this rule is that a 
landlord is not generally liable for negligence with respect to the condition of 
property after the transfer of possession and control to a tenant. The tenant 
                                                                                                                   
Implied Warranty of Habitability, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 195, 418 (2011). The public housing 
tenancy emerged to give tenants security and control. See Shelby D. Green, The Public 
Housing Tenancy: Variations on the Common Law that Give Security and Control, 43 CATH. 
L. REV. 681, 720 (1994). 
195 At the height of this “revolution,” one commentator put forth the notion of 
making “slumlordism” a tort, giving a cause of action to the tenants in slum properties. See 
Joseph L. Sax & Fred J. Hiestand, Slumlordism as a Tort, 65 MICH. L. REV. 869, 875 (1966). 
196 Yet many have questioned the success of the implied warranty in improving 
the housing conditions of the poor. See Super, supra note 194, at 389 (suggesting that the 
warranty has largely failed to achieve any meaningful improvement in housing conditions, 
largely because of the slowing of the general anti-poverty movement occurring during the 
same era, including the lack of a coherent, broadly accepted set of goals, the lack of agreement 
on the causes of poverty, and the loss of sympathy for the poor. There was also a general 
failure to provide the practical infrastructure, the procedural and institutional steps for the 
assertion of rights); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 514–18 (5th ed. 1998) 
(asserting that housing code enforcement leads to a substantial reduction in the supply of low-
income housing coupled with a substantial rise in the price of the remaining supply; 
ordinances designed to protect tenants by giving them more procedural rights in the event the 
landlord tries to evict them, by entitling tenants to withhold rent if landlords fail to make 
repairs required by the lease, by requiring landlords to pay interest in security deposits have 
the same effect as code enforcement); but see Duncan Kennedy, The Effect of the Warranty of 
Habitability on Low-Income Housing: “Milking” and Class Violence, 15 FL. STATE U. L. REV. 
484, 486–88 (1987) (selective enforcement of implied warranty could increase supply more 
than it decreases it, thus reducing rent levels for poor tenants). 
197 See, e.g., Bokis v. Champion Fin. Corp., 608 F. Supp. 585, 587 (D. Okla. 
1985). 
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had remedies against the landlord if his peaceable possession was disturbed 
and if injuries occurred in the common areas under the landlord’s control.198 
With the adoption of the implied warranty of habitability, the 
landlord-tenant relation was re-characterized as a contract, with ongoing, 
mutual obligations. The tenant was to pay rent and refrain from waste and 
the landlord in return, was to give possession and to repair as noticed. The 
landlord’s new relation with the tenant contemplated that degree of control 
and interest in the premises, ostensibly within the exclusive possession of the 
tenant, as necessary to maintain the premises. The duty places the landlord in 
the premises and the premises under his control. The duty gives the landlord 
the right and obligation to exercise dominion, even though not exclusive, 
over the premises. The duty therefore becomes a proxy for the control 
required under the common law for landlord liability. 199  Employing a 
                                                 
198 The rule in some states is that a landowner is not liable for injuries to an invitee 
from a patent defect in the premises pre-existing the arrival of the invitee and of which the 
invitee knew or had the means of knowing equal to the landowner. Johnston v. Ross, 590 
S.E.2d 386, 387 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003); Roth v. Wu, 405 S.E.2d 741, 742 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991). 
The courts have made clear that a landlord may not hide behind this principle to avoid 
statutory duties. This means that when a defect is in violation of a duty created by statute or 
administrative regulation, a landowner, nevertheless may be liable for injuries to third parties. 
Watts v. Jaffs, 455 S.E.2d 328, 329 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995); Crownover, 381 S.E.2d at 285 
(plurality) (recognizing important public policy in favor of preventing unsafe residential 
housing; landlord may be liable in tort for violation of duties created by housing codes or 
other legislation). 
199 Giacalone v. Hous. Auth., 51 A.3d 352, 357 n.4 (Conn. 2012) (“[I]t is the 
landlord’s control over the space, not its control over the potential danger, that gives rise to 
liability.”). A “proxy” is a form of legal fiction. The Black’s Law Dictionary’s definition of 
“proxy” is relatively narrow—“one who is authorized to act as a substitute for another,”—
suggesting a volitional act by both the giver of the authority and the one acting. BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1346 (9th ed. 2009). In legal reasoning and decision-making, the term has taken 
on much broader meaning and is used in much broader contexts. The term has come to 
connote a substitution of one thing for another, to achieve a particular result, much like a legal 
fiction. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 87–88 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (in 
determining the existence of an illegal tying arrangement, “consumer demand test [for 
separate products] as a rough proxy for whether a tying arrangement may, on balance, be 
welfare-enhancing and unsuited to per se condemnation;” allows the avoidance of direct 
inquiries into the efficiencies of a bundle, instead, the easy to administer proxies used for net 
efficiency); Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 512 (2005) (using “race as proxy for gang 
membership…society as a whole suffers); Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 514 (2000) 
(“ancestry can be a proxy for race”); Wilkens v. Gaddy, 130 S.Ct 1175, 1179 (2010) (“injury 
as a proxy for force”); In re Oil Spill by the Amoco Cadiz, 954 F.2d 1279, 1321 (7th Cir. 
1992) (“increase in travel time as a proxy for reduction in consumer surplus”); Archie v. City 
of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1220 (3d Cir. 1988) (“recklessness is a proxy for intent”); Gaworski 
v. ITT Commercial Fin. Corp., 17 F.3d 1104, 1119 (8th Cir. 1994) (“pension status, or in a 
similar situation, another empirically correlated factor, may be a ‘proxy’ for age in the sense 
that an employer may suppose a correlation between the two factors”); Riddle v. McLouth 
Steel Prods. Corp., 485 N.W.2d 676, 694 n.38 (Mich. 1992) (“Caniff thus illustrates the use of 
‘duty’/’no duty’ as a proxy for facts strong enough either to bar recovery as a matter of law 
under traditional contributory negligence doctrine, or that the absence of a warning would not 
have been a proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries, because he probably would have ignored a 
warning anyway.”). 
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“fiction” of landlord control over the premises based upon a duty to repair, at 
least against unsafe conditions, is no different from the fiction of 
constructive eviction. 
2.  The Fiction of the Rational Actor 
Another fiction, although not generally recognized as such, that of 
the “rational actor” can be used also to overrule the no tort liability rule. The 
rational actor is a character at the center of economic theory.200 The dogma 
of economic theory is that law should be analyzed not as a system of 
coercion, but as a system of implicit norms;201 that legal analysis should 
focus not on justice, but on efficiency. 202  Normative economics, 203 
prescriptive, judgmental,204 asks two questions: should efficiency be the goal 
of law and if so, how should the law be reformed to best serve that goal.205 
On the first inquiry, few would disagree that the study of economics, 
that is, the study of human behavior as a relationship between ends and 
scarce resources which have alternative uses,206 is important in devising rules 
for the allocation of resources. However, embracing normative economic 
theory should only be done after an examination of some of its flaws. 
Economic theory asks us to evaluate the market choices based upon whether 
                                                 
200 T.S. Ulen, Rational Choice Theory in Law and Economics, in ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 790, 791 (B. Bouckaert and G. DeGesst eds., 2001). 
201 Ugo A. Mattei et al., Comparative Law and Economics, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
LAW & ECONOMICS 505, 507 (B. Bouckaert and G. DeGesst eds., 1999), available at 
http://encyclo.findlaw.com/0560book.pdf. It is said that the foremost policy of the tort law is 
to deter harmful conduct and to ensure that innocent victims of that conduct will have redress. 
Callahan v. Cardinal Glennon Hosp., 863 S.W.2d 852, 861–62 (Mo. 1993) (en banc). 
“Cognate principles of equity and economic efficiency also inform that policy: that the costs 
of pervasive injury . . . shall be borne by those who can control the danger and make equitable 
distribution of the losses, rather than by those who are powerless to protect themselves.” Elam 
v. Alcolac, Inc., 765 S.W.2d 42, 176 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988). 
202 Ugo Mattei, supra note 201, at 507. 
203 In contrast, the school positive economics seeks to identify a legal rule and 
then make one or more descriptive statements about the economic effects of that rule. Herbert 
Hovenkamp, Positivism in Law & Economics, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 815, 821 (1990). Judge 
Richard Posner was perhaps the earliest chronicler for the postivists. In Law & Economics, he 
reviewed 1500 appellate court decisions to test his theory of negligence, concluding that they 
confirmed his hypothesis that the “dominant function of the fault system [was] to enervate 
rules of liability that if followed will bring about . . . the efficient—the cost-justified–level of 
accidents and safety.” Richard Posner, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 33 (1973). It was not 
significant to Judge Posner that the courts did not speak in terms of efficiency, because in his 
view, the true grounds of decision are often concealed, rather than illuminated by the 
characteristic rhetoric of judicial opinions. Id. at 18. 
204 Jon D. Hanson & Melissa R. Hart, Law and Economics, in A COMPANION TO 
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 311 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996). 
205 It seems that today’s legal economists most commonly inquire into the effects 
of different policies (the first positive issue) and recommend reforms in light of those effects 
(the second normative issue). Hanson & Hart, supra note 204, at 312. 
206 LIONEL ROBBINS, AN ESSAY ON THE NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF ECONOMIC 
SCIENCE 1–2, 16 (1932). 
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they produce an efficient result. This is a request that society cannot indulge 
without some hesitation, for efficiency is an ambiguous concept; it cannot be 
determined apart from its situational context.207 Although common terms are 
used with facility in the economics literature, there is yet no universality, 
since markets, which economics strive to assess, are subjective. As such, 
they are determined and must be evaluated through interpretative and 
representational techniques, which include references to many non-economic 
considerations, such as the humanities, ethics, culture, community, and 
aesthetics.208 This means that the analysis derived from economic theory is 
contested as market transactions are constrained and influenced by an 
individual’s experiences, position and frame of reference within the 
community. 209  The imperatives of cultural references in turn means that 
notwithstanding the cogency of the economics of the housing market—its 
components, barriers to entry, pricing—economics cannot obviate the burden 
of exercising our normative judgments about the effects (on availability, 
costs, and condition) of the choices made in the market.210 
Equally concerning about the application of economic theory to 
resolve legal issues is the centrality of the rational actor, by which the merits 
of all market transactions are measured. Economic theory posits that the 
rational actor, who with all else being equal, will chose that course that will 
maximize his gain or profit and that course is the one that is the most 
efficient. Economic analysis presumes the capacity to determine the different 
importance that individuals ascribe to different things and arranges them in a 
certain order.211 But, underneath the dogma, there are a host of improbable 
assumptions, only through which a market actor, rational in guise, but 
fictional in import, emerges.212 Indeed, observers of human nature see that 
                                                 
207 ROBIN PAUL MALLOY, LAW IN A MARKET CONTEXT: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
MARKET CONCEPTS IN LEGAL REASONING 59 (2004). Professor Malloy makes that law and 
markets can be profitably analyzed in relation to on another; that legal reasoning in market 
transactions cases should be informed not only by regard for what he believes is the 
ambiguous concept of efficiency, but equally by normative views that are guided by 
considerations of ethics and culture. Id. at 56, 64.   
208 Id. at 59, 60–61. 
209 Id. at 30. 
210 Id. at 100. 
211 James R. Hackney, Jr., Law and Neoclassical Economics: Science, Politics, 
and the Reconfiguration of American Tort Law Theory, 15 LAW AND HIST. REV. 275, 289 
(1997). 
212 ROBBINS, supra note 206, at 75–78. Economic analysis rests upon a series of 
assumptions, some contested, some not. ROBBINS, supra note 206, at 77. They include that the 
parties are rational, pursuing consistent ends by efficient means and are perfectly informed of 
the costs involved; transaction costs are zero or low; both parties are risk neutral, that is, they 
care only about the expected value of an option; the expected value of a risky situation is the 
absolute magnitude of the risk, should it occur, multiplied by the probability that it will occur 
(as distinguished from risk averse persons who care not only about the expected value, but 
also about the absolute magnitude of the risk); the parties know the legal rules. ROBBINS, 
supra note 206, at 87–89. The extent to which these assumptions affect the economic models 
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many actors are not rational in their choices, that is, some act or refuse to act 
out of sentiment, both good (sympathy) and bad (spite), and that most are 
narrowly and ruthlessly self-interested and would chose that course offering 
the greatest prospect for gain, even if others are harmed in the wake of the 
pursuit of self-aggrandizement.213 This self-interested actor stands in stark 
contrast to the fictional rational, efficiency-seeking actor admired in 
economic theory. 
The landlord at common law more resembled the self-interested 
actor as he sought maximum profits, by putting all the risks of harm onto the 
tenant and the law had long enabled him to do so by the no-repair rule. It is 
only by imposing a duty to repair that the landlord became a rational, 
efficiency-seeking actor.214 The better-maintained premises could command 
a higher rent. But, if the landlord’s liability for failing to perform this duty is 
limited to the diminution in value to the tenant, an amount that is likely to 
fall well short of the cost of paying for injury to the tenant, the rational, 
efficient-seeking landlord once again becomes the self-interested actor.215 
                                                                                                                   
depend variously upon their degree of plausibility and relevance. ROBBINS, supra note 206, at 
93. See also Hackney, supra note 211, at 289. 
213 Indeed, this seems to be a defining principle of macroeconomics, the law of 
supply and demand; prices rise in tandem with demand and not any changes in the intrinsic 
quality of the goods offered for sale. Consider instances of price gouging after major weather 
events. For critiques of the rational actor theory, see RICHARD BARNES. PROPERTY RIGHTS AND 
NATURAL RESOURCES 44–46 (2009). 
214 Where the entitlement is placed affects transactions costs. If the onus of 
repairing is on the landlord, he need not coordinate with other parties (except to give notice as 
to when repairs will be undertaken) and thus will choose the least costly method. On the other 
side of this dynamic is that transactions costs (e.g., holdouts) can result in inefficient choices, 
wasting scare resources and causing a divergence between self-interest and public interest. 
215 The urban landlord and tenant dilemma fits neatly within Ronald Coase’s 
classic paradigm, the farmer and the rancher. See Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 
3 J. L. & ECON. 1, 2 (1960). The rancher and the farmer are on neighboring properties; and as 
the size of the cattle herd is increased, so is the damage to the farmer’s crops. Id. at 2–3. On 
the premise that transactions costs are zero, Coase concluded that costs would be internalized 
and production maximized. Id. at 3. This was so under two relevant legal regimes: liability for 
crop damage and no liability for crop damage. Id. at 5–8. Under the regime of liability, the 
rancher would not necessarily forgo additional cattle production in order to avoid liability but 
would add cattle as long as the liability costs were not greater than the additional value of 
production. Id. at 5–6. Coase concluded that an efficient, social wealth maximizing, 
production allocation would result if the court were to simply assign property rights. Id. at 7. 
He theorized that regardless of who has the legal right, they will bargain to the most efficient 
result. Id. at 8. That is, the party with the right will accept an amount at least as large as the 
injury she would otherwise suffer to permit the other party to continue with his wrongful 
conduct. Id. at 7. At the same time, the other party, in order to continue with his wrongful 
conduct, will pay the party with the right an amount up to his opportunity costs in ceasing the 
wrongful conduct. Id. If the liability costs (what the party with the right would demand) are 
greater than opportunity costs (what the other party would forego by altering his conduct and 
under which would offer to pay some amount), then the other party will pursue the course 
involving the lower cost, that is, avoiding liability in the first place to the other party with the 
right. Id. 
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On the other side of the landlord-tenant dynamic, is the self-
interested tenant, who seeks a decent dwelling at the lowest cost. The 
rational tenant may make a calculated decision to forego improvements in 
the quality of the premises if the costs of decent housing leave little or no 
money for food, clothing and other necessities of life. This decision cannot 
be characterized as one being made by a rational actor, but one who acts out 
of economic duress. If the latter, then the decision cannot be regarded as 
efficient, much less, socially desirable under a normative review, which as I 
stated earlier, must accompany any economics analysis. 
Placing the burden of repair on the landlord will not relieve the 
tenant of all responsibility in the care and safeguard of the premises. If the 
cost of avoiding destructive conduct in the premises and of giving notice to 
the landlord of defects is less than the injury that would be suffered by an 
unrepaired defect and the risks that the landlord may not have funds or 
insurance to compensate him for injuries, the tenant will act responsibly and 
give notice of defects when they first are noticed and usually less costly to 
repair. In other words, ex-ante precautions may be superior to ex-post 
liability or injury. To put liability upon a landlord for injuries only when he 
fails to act reasonably under all the circumstances, including requiring 
knowledge of dangerous conditions, will put the onus on the tenant to alert 
the landlord to defects.216 This makes sense if we accept that the rational 
tenant would opt not for recovery of monetary damages after an injury, but a 
safe dwelling throughout the tenure. 
On the second inquiry, that is, how should the law be reformed to 
accomplish the end of efficient results, I say that a rule imposing tort liability 
on landlord for failing to use reasonable care to maintain the premises in a 
safe condition is required. There are existing references already in the law to 
support this position, particular Judge Learned Hand’s famous formulation of 
the negligence standard in United States v. Carroll Towing Co. 217  A 
                                                                                                                   
In the landlord-tenant context, if the cost of routine maintenance is less than the cost 
of a personal injury judgment, the landlord will provide regular maintenance. In this instance, 
the landlord will also seek to spread the burden of any liability by monitoring the tenant’s 
behavior as well as by contracting for insurance, which by transforming a potential loss of 
some absolute amount into premiums equal to the expected value of the loss, allows the 
insured to behave as if the was risk neutral. The big difference in the landlord tenant context is 
that transactions costs are not zero and the odds of the parties bargaining over rights are as 
fictional as the rational, efficiency-seeking landlord. While this qualification seems to severely 
undercut the predictive value of the Coase Theorem, it is nonetheless an important way of 
organizing legal reasoning and argument based upon references to externalities and 
transactions costs. 
216 “In negligence, we evaluate the degree of one’s negligence not by an isolated 
review of conduct, but with reference to a community standard and an expectation of 
reasonable care.” MALLOY, supra note 207, at 229. Similarly, in contract, “we interpret the 
terms of an agreement with reference to industry standards, course of dealing, and reasonable 
community expectations.” Id. 
217 United States v. Carroll Towing Co, 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). There, the 
defendant, Carroll Towing Co., was readjusting a loose line of barges moored in New York 
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defendant should be deemed negligent and the plaintiff partly culpable, 
whenever the cost to the party of preventing an accident is less than the 
expected cost of the accident.218 If the burden (B) is less than probability of 
an accident occurring times the extent of the projected harm (PL), then the 
additional or marginal investment in accident prevention will have positive 
net returns in terms of a marginal reduction in expected accident costs.219 By 
holding a party liable for whom the burden is less than PL, the law will 
encourage efficient investments in accident prevention, that is, the law will 
induce parties to internalize their externalities.220   
Much of law can be understood as an attempt to compel individuals 
to take into account externalities. Society as a whole is better off, in 
economic and psychic terms when people behave in ways that avoid or at 
least minimize harm from accidents.221 Treating landlords as the rational, 
efficiency actor and exposing them to tort liability when they do not 
internalize externalities is the normatively efficient rule that will prevent 
accidents and lead to safe dwellings. The rational actor will respond to 
incentives and disincentives—fines, penalties, damages—which will be 
considered in making rational decisions.222 A legal rule that requires specific 
conduct and that carries clear consequences, if normatively accepted, will 
result in predictable responses when people act rationally.223 
                                                                                                                   
harbor. Id. at 171. One of the barges, the Anna C, broke loose and crashed into a tanker. Id. 
The tanker’s propeller damaged the hull of the Anna C, and she sank. Id. The plaintiff, the 
owner of the Anna C sued Carroll Towing Co., for damages. Id. The question before the court 
was whether the tug owner, who had been deemed negligent at trial, could avoid paying the 
damages to the owner of the Anna C. Id. The defendant argued that the barge owner was 
partially to blame for the accident because he failed to keep a bargee on board. Carroll 
Towing Co., 159 F.2d at 171. Judge Learned Hand agreed. Id. at 172. 
218 Judge Hand devised a pithy algebraic formulation for this conclusion: the 
probability of the accident occurring (P); the gravity of the resulting loss or injury if an 
accident occurs (L); and the burden of precautions adequate to avert the accident (B). Id. at 
173. He found that the barge owner was contributorily negligent because the cost of leaving a 
bargee on the barge (B) was less than the probability of a loss (P), times the severity of the 
loss (L). Id. at 173–74. 
219 Id. 
220 Externalities are costs that an actor’s actions impose on others but does not 
consider in the calculation of his costs of acting. See BARNES, supra note 213, at 42. 
221 Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors, 625 A.2d 1110, 1118 (N.J. 1993) (holding 
that real estate brokers have a duty to warn prospective purchasers of hazards known and 
revealed by reasonable inspection undertaken for purposes of the open house). “Whether a 
person owes a duty of reasonable care toward another turns on whether the imposition of such 
a duty satisfies an abiding sense of basic fairness under all of the circumstances in light of 
considerations of public policy. That inquiry involves identifying, weighing, and balancing 
several factors—the relationship of the parties, the nature of the attendant risk the opportunity 
and ability to exercise care, and the public interest in the proposed solution.” Id. at 1115. 
222 MALLOY, supra note 207, at 145. 
223 Id. 
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B.  Fictions that Impede Change 
While fictions normally operate to advance the law, old conceptions 
can frustrate change when they continue to be employed indiscriminately 
even after they have strayed far from their original mission. That is the case 
in the landlord-tenant context where the anticipated benefits from the 
movement from property to contract is frustrated by the ancient conception 
of contract as being tied to economic losses alone. Accordingly, courts that 
deny recovery for personal injury from a breach of the implied warranty of 
habitability, focus on the “warranty” part of that duty to repair, relying upon 
what is asserted as essential differences between contract and tort; that 
remedies for contract aim to ensure the non-breaching party the benefit of his 
bargain to compensate for economic losses, that consequential damages 
involving injury to person or property are generally not within the 
contemplation of the parties at contracting. 224  The economic loss rule 
prevents a party from claiming economic damages in a negligence claim 
absent physical property damage or bodily injury.225 Economic damages are 
damages for inadequate value, costs of repair and replacement of the 
defective product, or consequent loss or profits—without any claim of 
personal injury or damage to other property.226 The general idea behind the 
doctrine is to prevent dissatisfied buyers from using tort law to recover losses 
that were or should have been protected against through contract law.227 
The economic loss rule loses credibility by the convergence of 
contracts and torts. Though nominally distinct, they have a common history 
and share many current functions, such that the boundaries between these 
two areas have long-since blurred.228 Indeed, contract arose out of tort—the 
ancient cause of action of assumpsit, which was derived from the medieval 
notion of liability, 229  based upon the idea that the failure to perform a 
                                                 
224 Scandia Assocs., Inc., 717 N.E.2d at 32 (in the case of implied, as opposed to, 
express warranty). 
225 Radarowicz v. Ohlendorf, 441 N.E. 2d 324, 327 (Ill. 1982); Indemnity Ins. Co. 
of N. Am. v. Am. Aviation, Inc., 891 So. 2d 532, 536–37 (Fl. 2004); BRW, Inc. v. Difficy & 
Sons, Inc., 99 P. 3d 66, 72 (Colo. 2004). 
226 Id. 
227 Id. 
228 See generally Melissa T. Lonegrass, Convergence in Contort: Landlord 
Liability for Defective Premises in Comparative Perspective, 85 TUL. L. REV. 413, 417 
(2010); Howard ex rel. McIntyre v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 816 A.2d 1204, 1211–12 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 2003); Beese v. Nat’l Bank of Albany Park, 403 N.E.2d 595, 599 (Ill. Ct. App. 
1980) (refusing damages for personal injury due to the “economic and social consequences” 
involved). 
229 If one undertook to perform an act, but performed it poorly, then the one who 
relied upon the undertaking and suffered damage at the hands of the other could recover for 
those injuries. THEODORE F.T. PLUNKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 638–39 
(5th ed. 1956). A breach of promise was viewed as a form of deceit—a tort. The first part of 
the cause of action was an allegation that defendant undertook to do something—the predicate 
for the deception, but that the undertaking was performed badly, in which case, the plaintiff 
brought an action in trespass on the case (a claim based on a narrative of special facts and 
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promise was a form of deceit.230 In other words, when the common lawyers 
sought relief for their clients who had been wronged, but not through force 
and violence, which was required for a trespass action, they devised “trespass 
on the case,” a form of trespass under special circumstances. The vehicle 
became more or less an empty vessel for all sorts of relief, eventually leading 
to assumpsit, which in time transmogrified into contract.231 
Modern contract and tort law differ only on a fundamental level in 
the sense that in contract, one willingly undertakes an obligation to perform 
in a certain way, whereas in tort, the law requires an actor to behave in a way 
so as to avoid injury to another to whom the actor owes a duty or those to 
whom injury from the actor’s conduct is foreseeable.232 Tort liability focuses 
at first upon the actor. Is she engaged in an activity likely to cause harm? Is 
the harm to the plaintiff foreseeable? If so, the actor has a duty to use 
reasonable care. The template fits exactly the landlord-tenant relation. The 
landlord is an actor, providing premises for the tenant. It is foreseeable that 
the act of permitting an un-inhabitable condition to exist is likely to cause 
harm, unless the landlord exercised reasonable care. 
Even though the law made distinctions between types of recovery—
under the theory of tort, for injury to person or property233 and contract, for 
reliance interest and economic losses, 234  at bottom, the aim of awarding 
“damages, whether it is for breach of contract or for a tort, is so far as 
possible, to put the victim where he would have been if the breach or tort had 
not taken place.”235  
The line between contract and tort blurs even more where the state 
has chosen to regulate the relation between the parties by imposing 
obligations. This intervention was based upon the recognition that because 
housing markets do not lend themselves to conditions of perfect competition, 
the law of landlord-tenant relations could not be left to operate under market 
forces alone.236 The barriers to entry are formidable; the persistent mismatch 
                                                                                                                   
circumstances) for deceit caused by the failure to perform the undertaking. Id. at 372–73. 
Professor Plunknett states that “While the relation might have been fundamentally contract, 
yet, it was being forced into the form of tort simply because the action of covenant could only 
be brought upon a deed under seal.” Id. at 638. He explains further, “But it must not be 
imagined that this is the story of the slow dawn of the idea of contract in the minds of 
common lawyers. They knew quite well what a covenant was, but they deliberately resorted to 
this juggling with trespass because they felt unable to sustain an action of covenant without a 
deed.” Id. 
230 See id. 
231 PLUNKNETT, supra note 229. 
232 Lonegrass, supra note 228, at 414. 
233 See W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 1, 
at 5–6 (5th ed.1984). 
234 See id. 
235 Chronister Oil Co. v. Unocal Ref. & Mktg., 34 F.3d 462, 464 (7th Cir. 1994). 
236 See Rabin, supra note 2 at 517–20, 540–49 (describing the conditions urging 
the revolution in landlord-tenant law, including persistent shortages and obstacles to new 
construction). 
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between availability and demand are urged by changes in the economy at 
large; 237  and the complexity of housing development precludes quick 
responses. 238  Where true market conditions are out of sync with the 
theoretical model, then governmental intervention becomes necessary to 
facilitate the coordination of public and private interests. Thus, if the aim of 
the regulation involves more than simply ensuring the bargain, but in the 
case of landlord-tenant, to insure safe and decent housing as the state 
determines, then relegating parties to traditional contract remedies nullifies 
the corrective mission of the regulation.239 In the landlord-tenant context, it 
really should not matter whether the landlord is liable because he failed to 
fulfill his warranty duties or is otherwise negligent, so long as the tenant’s 
injuries can be traced somehow to the landlord’s failure to fulfill a duty, 
which if it had been performed would have avoided the injury. 
Recently, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Scott v. 
Garfield has forthrightly recognized the tort aspects of the warranty.240 The 
court explained that the implied warranty of habitability as it had developed 
in its decisions was a “multi-faceted legal concept that encompasses contract 
and tort principles, as well as the state building and sanitary codes.”241 
Although the warranty itself arises from the residential leasing contract 
between landlord and tenant, the court has imposed a legal duty on the 
landlord, in the form of an implied agreement, to ensure that the dwelling 
complied with state building and sanitary codes throughout the lease.242 At 
the same time, the warranty sounds in tort as a tenant may recover damages 
for personal injuries caused by a breach of the warranty.243 
                                                 
237 See Bruce A. Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing Markets on Behalf of the 
Poor, 80 YALE L.J. 1093, 1102–06 (1971) (describing market disequilibrium leading to need 
for intervention). 
238 Rabin, supra note 2, at 558–62. 
239 The other concern reflected in courts’ reluctance to find tort liability for breach 
of warranty, pertained to the standard for determining liability: strict liability or negligence. 
Liability for breach of contract is imposed in the absence of fault, whereas liability in 
negligence requires a failure to act as a reasonable persons under the circumstances, i.e., it 
requires not simply that harm resulted, but that the harm came from the failure of the actor to 
use care to avert foreseeable injury. By imposing liability on landlords only upon a finding of 
fault as in all negligence cases, the concern is eliminated. 
240 Scott v. Garfield, 912 N.E.2d 1000, 1005 (Mass. 2009); see also Whetzel v. 
Jess Fisher Mgt. Co., 282 F.2d 943, 946 (D.C. 1960) (finding housing regulations to create 
legal rights and duties enforceable in tort by private parties). 
241 Scott, 912 N.E.2d at 1005 
242 Id. (citing Crowell v. McCaffrey, 386 N.E.2d 1256, 1261 (Mass. 1979)); Doe 
v. New Bedford Hous. Auth., 630 N.E.2d 248, 253 (Mass. 1994) (minimum standards of 
warranty of habitability measured by applicable state building and sanitary codes); Boston 
Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d 831, 843 (Mass. 1973) (“This warranty (insofar as it 
is based on the State Sanitary Code and local health regulations) cannot be waived by any 
provision in the lease or rental agreement.”). 
243 Id. (citing Crowell, 386 N.E.2d at 1261); see, e.g., Henderson v. W.C. Haas 
Realty Mgt., 561 S.W.2d 382 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977); Dwyer v. Skyline Apts., Inc., 301 A.2d 
463 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1973), aff’d, 311 A.2d 1 (N.J. 1973); Rivera v. Selfon Home Repairs & 
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The Restatement takes the position that breach of a warranty of 
habitability may expose the landlord to tort liability in negligence. It states 
that a landlord is subject to tort liability if the landlord fails to exercise 
reasonable care to repair a dangerous condition located on the leased 
premises, if the existence of the dangerous condition violates an implied 
warranty of habitability, and if the tenant, or someone on the premises with 
the tenant’s permission, is thereby harmed.244 In advocating this position, a 
reporter’s note to the Restatement states: 
Once it has become socially and judicially accepted that the 
implied warranty of habitability imposes a duty on the 
landlord to provide his tenant with housing which does not 
subject the tenant to unreasonable danger of harm, it will be 
difficult to insulate the landlord from tort liability when his 
failure to meet his duty results in injury to the tenant or one 
on the leased property with his consent. It would be 
disconcerting if the tenant who fell through the rotten floor 
of his kitchen could withhold rent until the hole was 
repaired, but could not recover for the personal injury he had 
sustained. The tort liability of the landlord in this situation 
serves the deterrent, compensatory, and loss distribution 
functions of tort law.245  
                                                                                                                   
Imp. Co., 439 A.2d 739 (Pa. Super. 1982); see also Antwaun A. v. Heritage Mutual Ins., 596 
N.W.2d 456, 468 (Wis. 1999) (“A tenant’s claim for breach of the implied warranty of 
habitability is a breach of contract claim for contractual damages. An injured parties’ claim for 
personal injuries is a tort claim in negligence for compensatory damages. Such claims may 
coexist, they may be caused by the same act, and they may be owned by the same party if it is 
the tenant who was injured. It is not the breach of warranty, however, that gives rise to the 
cause of action for the personal injury. Instead, it is the negligent act or omission.”). While the 
court had earlier found that where a tenant seeks to recover for economic loss under the 
warranty of habitability, the applicable standard is one of strict liability, rather than 
negligence, which would require that the landlord have notice of the defect, it determined that 
it had left open the question whether, when a tenant seeks to recover for personal injuries 
caused by a breach of warranty, the standard is one of negligence. Berman & Sons v. 
Jefferson, 396 N.E.2d 981, 983–86 (Mass. 1979). 
244 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY, LAND. & TEN. §17.6 (1977). 
A landlord is subject to liability for physical harm caused to the tenant and 
others upon the leased property with the consent of the tenant or his 
subtenant by a dangerous condition existing before or arising after the 
tenant has taken possession, if he has failed to exercise reasonable care to 
repair the condition and the existence of the condition is in violation of: 
 (1) an implied warranty of habitability; or 
 (2) a duty created by statute or administrative regulation. 
Id. The term “physical harm” contained in § 17.6 has been interpreted to include harm to land 
and chattels as well as harm to the person. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 7.3 (1965). 
245 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 17.6, Reporter’s Note 8 (1977). 
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On the same plane is the Uniform Commercial Code. It expresses the 
policy that merely compensating a plaintiff for the lost value of the product 
may not make the plaintiff whole, but that in some cases, additional—
consequential—damages may be in order. Section 2-715(2) defines 
consequential damages to include: 
a) any loss resulting from general or particular requirements 
and needs of which the seller at the time of contracting had 
reason to know and which could not reasonably be prevented 
by cover or otherwise; and 
b) any injury to person or property proximately resulting 
from any breach of warranty.246 
The Restatement and the UCC get it right, by seeing the underlying 
objectives of the rules and that they can only be fulfilled if recovery is not 
limited to economic losses alone.247 
V.  A NEW PROPERTY RIGHT IN TENANT ENFORCED BY A 
PROPERTY RULE 
The use of a legal fiction creates the illusion that nothing has 
changed, when in fact, the world is spinning; a transformation has occurred. 
Fictions ask not only that we suspend belief that a change has occurred, but 
also that we accept a new concept. The natural human tendency is to resist 
change, for it is destabilizing; unknown, untested, portends evil. One defense 
to change at least in property law was the numerus clausus principle.248 But, 
it was not the fear of evil that led to the numerus clausus principle, but rather 
the effects of change. If things change, new things must be learned, new 
cautions adopted and new forms invented. Numerus clausus thus has drawn 
lines around the categories of property interests—the fee simple, the life 
estate, the lease, although not around the more physical aspects or 
characteristics of ownership rights.249 The latter can be limited, carved up 
                                                 
246 U.C.C. § 2-715 (1977). See Ford Motor Co. v. Reid, 465 S.W.2d 80, 84–85 
(Ariz. 1971) (discussing expanded damage recovery); Tuttle v. Kelly-Springfield Tire Co., 
585 P.2d 1116, 1119 (Okla. 1978) (recovery for personal injuries despite contractual 
limitation on remedies); see also Robert J. Williams, Getting What You Bargained For: How 
Courts Might Provide a Coherent Basis for Damages That Arise When Remedies Fail of Their 
Essential Purposes, 5 VA. L & BUS. REV. 131, 142–43 (2010) (discussing the tension between 
freedom of contract and unconscionability when parties purport to limit remedies for breach of 
contract). 
247 Beacon Residential Cmty. Ass’n. v. Skidmore, Owings & Merrill LLP, 327 
P.3d 850, 859 (Cal. 2014) (architects not in privity with unit owners, owe a duty of care and 
can be liable for negligent design). 
248 Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of 
Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 3–4 (2000). 
249 See id. 
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and consumed in an almost unlimited number of ways.250 Over the centuries, 
the attributes and advantages of ownership have expanded and contracted in 
response to living conditions, environmental concerns, as well as evolving 
notions of fairness. In the landlord-tenant context, an owner lacks the right to 
exclude prospective purchasers and renters based upon handicap or race.251 
An owner may not rent a space smaller than 400 square feet without 
compliance with building and housing codes.252 An owner may not charge 
rent above a level set by the government. On the other side of each of these 
limitations is a correlative right in the tenant. 
With the implied warranty of habitability, the legislatures and courts 
have created a new property right in the tenant—to be free of hazardous 
conditions—while simultaneously contracting the landlord’s right—to lease 
property in “as is” condition. As an owner has the duty to repair, the tenant 
has the right to habitable and safe dwelling. 
Though of only relatively recent origin, few doubt that this right 
goes to the essence of the tenancy, as much as the right to exclusive 
possession of the premises for the term. Resort to public law to confer this 
right was necessary because it was unlikely that the parties would have 
bargained for this allocation—the transaction costs and unequal positions of 
the parties are too great to overcome.253 The question remains as to how 
should the tenants’ new right to a habitable dwelling be enforced or 
protected. Most courts and statutes afford a tenant affirmative relief—right to 
compel repair, the right to withhold rent, and most allow recovery for 
personal injury where the conditions lead to injury—essentially by applying 
a property rule.254 But the no tort liability rule, still embraced by a few courts 
and which was not disavowed by the URLTA is essentially the enforcement 
of the right by a liability rule. The conventional view on liability rules is that 
they are the best that can be done under the circumstances.255 The landlord-
tenant scenario falls far outside the normal context in which a liability rule is 
thought appropriate, that is, where transactions costs are high because there 
are many parties interested in the dispute, among which are potential 
                                                 
250 An owner can give another the right to pick apples, to put up a billboard, to 
graze cattle, all the while retaining ownership in fee. 
251 Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601, 3604. 
252 This has historically been the case in New York City, though the current trend 
is toward amending this standard to allow for smaller, so-called “micro” apartments. See 
Natalie Shutler, Home Shrunken Home: New York’s First Micro-Apartments, Prefabricated in 
Brooklyn, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2015), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2015
/02/22/realestate/micro-apartments-tiny-homes-prefabricated-in-brooklyn.html. 
253 It is the reality of inequality of bargaining position, that forbids a tenant from 
waiver the right to a habitable premises. Hilder, 478 A.2d at 208; N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 
235-b. 
254 Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1109–10 (1972). 
255 James E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, Property Rules and Liability Rules: The 
Cathedral in Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 440, 457 (1995). 
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holdouts and free riders.256 Although the only transaction cost appearing in 
the landlord-tenant context is the burden of acquiring information (about the 
existence of hazards, their severity, costs of repair) by the tenant, there are 
more compelling reasons why a liability rule is not the best. Liability rules 
aim to award objective damages,257 which by their nature will often fail to 
come close to fully compensating the value of the right lost. This is because 
value is not a monolithic concept, but is as contested and contextual as 
efficiency.258 The value of property must have reference to its owner’s and 
the community’s expectation of deriving a benefit—whether economic or 
psychic. To the urban residential tenant, that value includes not only the 
value of a decent, habitable place to live, but freedom from injury as a 
consequence of the infringement of that right by the landlord’s failure to 
repair. Such value can only be assessed, after an injury has occurred, too late 
to achieve the end of recognizing that right to start with. Only by assigning to 
a tenant ex ante, the right to recover for all losses, including from the 
consequences that occur ex post from the landlord’s infringement of that 
right as part of the right to repair, will the goal of safe and decent rental 
housing be achieved.259 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The social and political facts that emerged prompting the 
“revolution” in landlord-tenant law was the recognition that housing was a 
basic need, and many seeking it were made vulnerable by their impoverished 
condition. Observers also realized that dilapidated housing was a social evil 
that could not be confined successfully to the areas where the poor housing 
was found. Also emerging throughout the legal and political system was the 
firm conviction that law should serve human values. As Professor Glendon 
pointed out, there came a marked shift from private law to public law and 
this was occurring throughout our legal system.260 Merchants were subject to 
implied warranties; home builders warranted the quality of construction; and 
                                                 
256 Even so, the usual mantra is that a liability rule may not be appropriate where 
these conditions do not exist. 
257 Krier & Schwab, supra note 255, at 457–58. 
258 In sales transactions, fair market value is determined in a number of ways, 
including comparable sales, which depends on the relative value of property similarly situated 
and appointed. 
259 James Carter so aptly described the relationship between law and custom:  
Law, Custom, Conduct, Life—different names for almost the same 
thing—true names for different aspects of the same thing—are so 
inseparably blended together that one cannot be thought of without the 
other. No improvement can be effected in one without improving the 
other, and no retrogressing can take place in one without a corresponding 
decline in the other.  
JAMES COOLIDGE CARTER, LAW: ITS ORIGIN, GROWTH, & FUNCTION 320 (2d ed. 
1974). 
260 Glendon, supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
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sellers were obligated to make disclosures about the condition of the 
premises. While the differences between property law and contract law 
largely remained, the law stepped in to ameliorate the harsh contract relation 
with implied covenants—of good faith and fair dealing 261 —and 
unconscionability.262 In property, the law moved from Blackstone’s despotic 
dominion, to limits on taking down trees, 263  curtailments of the right to 
exclude where larger public policy loomed,264 and the prohibition against 
discrimination based upon race or handicap.265 There came a time during the 
revolution when courts, determined that in fulfilling their traditional roles as 
defenders of justice, they needed to break with the past and announce a new 
rule.266 
Beginning in the 19th century and continuing in the 20th, law came 
to assume a more functional attitude, that it must serve some purpose other 
than maintaining order; 267 that is, the rules or laws chosen to be applied by 
judges should be a means to an end, purposive instruments, embodying value 
choices. Whether that end is efficiency or distributive justice, 268  the 
imperatives are the same. To say that clinging to the no tort liability is 
medieval is to disserve the courts and lawyers of that time.269 
The promulgation of the URLTA, although it only embraced, and 
did not start the “revolution” in landlord-tenant law, was yet momentous. Its 
aim to consolidate and bring coherence to the seemingly disparate changes 
occurring nationwide is surely to be lauded.270 Perhaps that was the problem. 
Rather than setting out to create a new regime of landlord-tenant relations, it 
                                                 
261 Erk v. Moran, 901 N.E.2d 187, 190–91 (N.Y. 2008). 
262 Williams v. Walker-Thomas, 198 A.2d 914, 916 (D.C. 1964). 
263 New Jersey Builders Ass’n v. Twp. of Jackson, 970 A.2d 992 (N.J. 2009). 
264 State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 371–72 (N.J. 1971). 
265 Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601, 3604. 
266 Sargent, 308 A.2d at 528; Sommer v. Kridel, 378 A.2d 767 (N.J. 1977); 
Kendall v. Pestana, 709 P.2d 837 (Cal. 1985); Javins, 428 F.2d at 1071; Tristram’s Landing v. 
Wait, 327 N.E.2d 727 (Mass. 1975); Davis, 480 So. 2d 625. 
267 Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: An Author’s Reflections, 76 
DENVER L. REV. 937, 937 (1999). 
268 RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 11–15 (1971) (conceiving justice as fairness in 
treatment and in the allocation of social benefits). 
269 In Javins, the court expressed its view that it was the duty of courts to 
reappraise old doctrines in light of the facts and values of contemporary life—particularly old 
common law doctrine which the courts themselves created and developed. Javins, 478 F.2d at 
1074. In a letter to Professor Rabin, Judge J. Skelly Wright, who authored the Javins opinion, 
stated that: 
Obviously, judges cannot be unaware of what all people, know and feel. . . 
. I was indeed influenced by the facts that, during the nationwide racial 
turmoil of the sixties. . . . There is no doubt in my mind that these 
conditions played a subconscious role in influencing my landlord-tenant 
decisions. . . . I didn’t like what I saw, and did what I could to ameliorate, 
if not eliminate, the injustice involved in the way many poor were 
required to live in the nation’s capital. 
Rabin, supra note 2, at 180. 
270 See discussion supra Parts I & II. 
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focused too narrowly on correcting what was perceived as the then most 
pressing concern. There are as I have pointed out, many good reasons for 
avoiding a complete overhaul of law.271 Nonetheless, the reasons offered for 
continuing to adhere to the common law no tort liability are not at all 
convincing.272 Surely, that because it has always been the rule is not a good 
reason and landlords could not have missed the revolution—it was too 
pervasive. While fictions make law malleable, allowing sensible responses 
under the semblance of stability, sometimes resort to them disserves the ends 
of a coherent and sensible legal order. A forthright movement would serve us 
better. 
 
                                                 
271 See discussion supra Parts I & II. 
272 See discussion supra Parts I & II. 
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